Anti-takeover Provisions,Institutional Investors And Stock Price Information Content

M&A in the capital market can alleviate the pain in the process of economic reform and development to a certain extent.M&A can optimize the industrial structure and alleviate the problem of overcapacity.In order to achieve higher sales channels and market expansion,the acquirer obtains higher profits and acquires control over the target company by acquiring shares of listed companies.However,there are attacks and defenses.The target company uses the "anti-acquisition shield"to deal with possible hostile takeovers.There are more and more hostile takeovers in the mergers and acquisitions of listed companies in China,and there will be large-scale hostile takeovers every year,such as Sina's attack on Shanda,GF's attack on CITIC Securities,and the recent "Baowan dispute"."Remind investors to pay attention to the company's anti-takeover measures.Therefore,this paper wants to study how the corporate system at the micro level affects the macro-level market through the study of the anti-acquisition clause.The most direct impact is the stock price.Therefore,this paper studies the impact of the anti-acquisition clause on the stock price information content.This paper first systematically sorts out related literature at home and abroad,and finds that as a supervisory mechanism of control rights,the anti-acquisition clause can not only affect the micro level of the company,but also influence the information efficiency of the capital market through external institutional investors.Based on this,this paper constructs the logical relationship between "anti-acquisition clauses—institutional investors-stock price information content",and puts forward the main hypothesis of this paper:the anti-acquisition clause of listed companies will reduce the shareholding ratio of institutional investors and institutional investors.The trading ratio further reduces the information content of the stock price.However,compared with the average role of research on anti-acquisition clauses in the capital market,this paper first divides the types of institutional investors,and studies the different intermediary roles of stable institutional investors and transaction institutional investors;The internal and external factors divide the company,and the target company's equity concentration,the nature of the actual controller,the transparency of accounting information and the legal environment of the region are used as the criteria to study the anti-acquisition clauses in different situations and the stock price synchronization and institutional investment.Different roles.In order to verify the hypothesis,this paper selects the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company from 2012 to 2016 as a sample,builds the company's anti-acquisition model,calculates the company's stock price synchronicity,and selects the instrumental variable,using two-stage least squares regression(2sls).Eliminate endogenous problems for robustness testing.The research results show that:by introducing institutional investors as intermediate variables,the fewer anti-acquisition clauses,the stronger the supervision role of institutional investors,the more favorable it is to improve the stock price information and reduce the stock price synchronization.Further research found that stable institutional investment plays a greater role in the holding channel,and transactional institutional investors play a greater role in the trading channel.At the same time,they find that the anti-acquisition clause is low in equity concentration,private,accounting information.Companies with low transparency or poor legal systems can play a bigger role.Finally,this paper puts forward some suggestions from the actual situation of China's current law and market.