The Nature Of Property Right,Managerial Power And Inefficiency Investment

The investment of enterprises has always been a hot topic by scholars.At the micro level,investment activity is one of the most critical financial problems.On the macro level,the rapid development of economy after the reform and opening up is inseparable from the efficient investment activities.However,in fact,our country's overall investment efficiency is ongoing,and it is quite comon that enterprises has inefficiency investment.Among numerous factors impacting the non-efficiency investment of enterprises,the managerial power is one of the factors that cannot be ignored.The principal-agent relationship formed by the separation of ownership and management in modern enterprises leads to the existence of managers self-interest and opportunism.In order to pursue more control benefits,the managers may take the maximization of personal interests as the objective and ignore the value of the enterprise in the selection of investment behaviors,resulting in the production of non-efficiency investment.Therefore,this paper studies the relationship between managerial power and inefficiency investment from the perspective of management power.At the same time,considering the Chinese special institutional background,the different nature of property right,the government's external oversight of enterprise,management self-interest behavior by different levels of constraint,therefore this paper will put the nature of property right,managerial power and inefficiency investment in a research framework,and research the relationship between the three.This paper selects the listed companies of shenzhen and Shanghai a-shares as the research samples from 2012 to 2016,and adopts the method of theoretical analysis and empirical test to study the relationship between managerial power and inefficiency investment.Besides,considering the nature of property right of Chinese enterprises,in the process of research,the factors of the nature of property right of the companies are also added to study the differences between different the nature of property right.The following conclusions are obtained:(1)With other variables controlled,managerial power has a positive impact on inefficiency investment of the enterprises;(2)With other variables controlled,compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises can alleviate the inefficiencies caused by managerial power.Based on the theoretical and empirical research results,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions on how to reduce the inefficiency investment,from the management itself,the enterprises and the government.Managers should strengthen self-discipline and make enterprise value as the primary goal.Enterprises should strengthen the restrict of managerial power,constantly improve the corporate governance structure,formulate a scientific and reasonable incentive system and strengthen the construction of enterprise internal control.The government should strengthen the supervision of enterprises and actively promote the process of managers' reform and establish a perfect manager market,so as to restrain the “agent” behavior of management and curb the abuse of management power.