Study On The Relationship Among Manager's Behavior?Accounting Conservatism And Investment Efficiency

Investment decision is one of the most important financial decisions of an enterprise.Its quality will affect the efficiency of subsequent resource allocation and the future development of enterprises.Therefore,the investment decisions of enterprises have been the focus of the academia.Based on the theory of information asymmetry and principal-agent theory,the traditional research is based on the rational man hypothesis,and explores the influence of managers on the inefficiency investment of enterprises.With the development of behavioral finance,scholars realized that human beings are bounded rational,and they will be influenced by cognitive biases in the decision-making process.So scholars began to explore the influence of managers on the investment decision making behavior of enterprises under the hypothesis of bounded rationality.In this paper,we combine the agency behavior under the manager's rational hypothesis with the overconfidence behavior under the manager's bounded rationality hypothesis,and study the influence of manager's behavior on the inefficient investment of enterprises.Accounting conservatism as one of the intrinsic properties of the quality of accounting information,to improve the transparency of accounting information,at the same time can reduce the information asymmetry between the internal and external stakeholders,external help investors identify inefficient investment projects,thus easing the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises.From the perspective of accounting conservatism,it is assumed that accounting conservatism may play a mediating role in the influence of managers' behavior on inefficient investment in enterprises.This paper brings managers' behavior,accounting conservatism and inefficient investment into the same model,and examines the way managers' behaviors affect inefficient investment.It provides some suggestions for standardizing managers' behavior,improving the quality of accounting information disclosure,and managing inefficient investment.Based on the above research background,the listed companies in A-share market of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016 are selected as the research object to examines the influence of managerial behavior on inefficient investment and the mediating role of accounting conservatism.This study finds that managers' agency behavior and overconfidence behavior will aggravate the inefficient investment level of enterprises.Specifically,managers' agency behavior and overconfidence behavior will lead to over-investment and lead to under-investment.Further studies show that managers' agency behavior and overconfidence behavior can reduce accounting conservatism and reduce investment efficiency,and there is a partial mediation effect between accounting conservatism and managerial efficiency.After the inefficiency investment is specifically divided into over-investment and under-investment,it is found that the transmission relationship between the three still exists.The innovation may exist in this article are as follows:(1)Many scholars are rational behavior separate research managers or non rational behavior on the efficiency of investment,the agent behavior of managers and managers under the hypothesis of rational and non rational hypothesis of overconfidence under combined,and further non efficiency of investment behavior of enterprises into excessive investment and inadequate investment,discusses the influence of management behavior on corporate investment behavior,and further enrich the research on the investment behavior of enterprises.(2)The manager behavior,accounting conservatism and corporate investment efficiency at the same time to study the relationship between the three almost no literature,this paper consider the introduction of accounting conservatism,discusses the path management behavior impact on enterprise efficiency of investment.It also enriches and deepens the existing research on the relationship between the two.