A Study On The Governance Of The Reduction Of Executives In Listed Companies On The Growth Enterprise Board Based On Perspective Of Information Disclosure Quality

Since the foundation of the GEM,there have been a serious problem of the reductions of senior executives,which have undermined the interests of external investors and affected the development of the entire GEM market.It also had a negative impact on corporate value.The issue that excecutives reduce the holdings frequently needs to be governed.While the studies on the reduction of the GEM executives focus on the study of executive deductions and market responses,and there are few studies on the governance of executives' reduction.Therefore,the study of the governance of executives' reduction has theoretical and practical significance.The theory of information superiority of senior executives pointed out that there is a close relationship between executives' reduction and information superiority.The implementation effect of new regulations which are published in 2017 also shows that strengthening the supervision of information disclosure quality can constrian the reduction of senior executives.The information advantages possessed by senior executives play an important role in their reduction.This article will analyze the governance of executives' reduction based on the quality of information disclosure,and use driver analysis as an entry point to analyze the relationship between executives' reduction and the quality of information disclosure.Improving the supervision of information disclosure quality can restrict executives' inclination to reduce their holdings.Because the executives who participated in the company's entrepreneurial stage take up a certain proportion of the GEM,and such executives have greater control,discourse power and information advantages.There are differences between them,and the effect that information disclosure quality supervision can play is different.This paper will further to distinguish them through grouping research.The executives holding shares pre-IPO take up a certain proportion of the GEM,due to the factthat the shareholding they owed have low shareholding costs,and most of executives belong to this kind,The regulatory role of external governance is limited,this article futher to explore which factors in the company will restrict the reduction of this kind executives.The study found that higher concentration of stocks can constrain pre-listed equity executives to reduce their holdings.The innovations of this paper's research are: 1.Put forward the ideas that grouping the pre-listed equity executives and post-listed equity executives,and analyze the particularities of the Growth Enterprise Market;2.The impact of the low cost of holding stocks of pre-listed equity executives on the reduction of the GEM is taken into account;3.Supplement the relevant theories on the relationship between executives' reduction of shareholdings and the quality of information disclosure and research on the constraints of senior management's reduction.