Research On Procurement Strategy Under Unreliable Supply

With the development of the economics globalization,more and more firms choose to focus on their core competence and outsource the raw material supply or even goods production to other firms.In the meanwhile,unreliable supply is becoming one of the inevitable problems of the buyers.And it can cause production changes,lowefficient operation and cost increases.Suppliers play an important roles in supply chain creating values,reducing cost and optimizing goods and services.So it's a necessary to do research on procurement strategies under condition of unreliable supplying for supply chain runs smoothly and profitably.This thesis studies procurement strategies at the risk of supply quantity uncertainty.Making centralization decision as benchmark,we compare decisions in Stackelberg Model and in Nash Bargaining.As retailer scales up and brand builds and develops,buyer dominates in the supply chain.Different from the traditional Stackelberg Model in which supplier is the leader,buyer is leader in our model and achieves it by announcing the potential maximal order quantity and setting order sensitivity parameter of order quantity to the supplier's wholesale price.This thesis assumes that the supply reliability can be improved by investing in effort,which can influence the unit cost of production.Nowadays upstream and downstream enterprises tend to cooperate closely because the competence in ultimate markets more and more depends on the performance of the whole supply chain.We consider the situation in which the buyer invests in effort and compare it with supplier investing.We also study the role of sensitivity parameter of order quantity to the supplier's wholesale price.And find that it really helps the buyer to dominate in supply chain and influence the supplier's decision on effort level and wholesale price.By setting reasonable sensitivity parameter,the buyer can improve his profit and the supply chain's.