Research On Supply Chain Merger Strategy Based On Trade Credit Financing

In recent years,with the development of the socialist market economy and the continuous improvement of the financial markets in China,generally considered profitable Merger activities are becoming increasingly active.On one hand,merger effects affect the ultimate performance of merger activities.On the other hand,the change of seller's market to buyer's market makes the competition increasingly fierce,and the gap between the market powers of different enterprises in the same industry gradually increases.In addition,large amount of R&D activities to consolidate or gain access to the market place renders companies in a dilemma of serious funding shortfalls.In order to face the changes in the market environment,maximize profits and earn better return to shareholders,enterprises choose whether to merge and determine the merger target is crucial,which is an urgent problem to be solved.To investigate merger strategies in supply chain,this thesis considers a supply chain with one supplier and two asymmetric capital-constrained retailers in which the supplier and two retailers interact in Stackelberg game vertically while two retailers compete in Cournot game horizontally.With the consideration of merger effects,market power and trade credits,this thesis studies the impacts of merger effects and retailers' market power on each player's post-merger optimal decisions and supply chain performances,and finally presents each participant's merger strategy chart.In the perspective of the supplier,when merger effects perform well,if two retailers' market power is similar,the supplier is willing to let them horizontally merge together;if the large retailer' market power becomes stronger,the supplier determines to merge with the large retailer.Moreover,when the merger effects are bad,the supplier hopes all players run on their own.In the opinion of the large retailer,when the merger effects perform well,it will seek horizontal merger.When the merger effects perform bad,if two retailers' market power is in balance,the large retailer hopes the supplier and the small retailer merge together;if the large retailer seizes stronger market power,it prefers all player operating alone.And for the small retailer,horizontal merger is its best choice.Surprisingly,this thesis finds a pareto zone rendering a multi-win result that all players prefer horizontal merger.