Font Size: a A A

Research On The Value Co-Creation And Distribution Of Crowdsourcing Considering The Creators' Fairness Preference

Posted on:2019-02-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H J CaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2429330596450299Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of the Internet,the Crowdsourcing has made the enterprises realize the diversified external human resources at low cost,and the optimal allocation of human resources on the world is of great significance to the development of enterprises in the knowledge age.Enterprise innovation model is also evolving and transforming into a prominent manifestation of this recognition,from the initial closed innovation to the later open innovation,and then through the open innovation model into a common Internet company and online Community innovation model,and finally evolved into Crowdsourcing.The Crowdsourcing based on Internet technology has gradually become an effective mode to assist enterprises of various types and sizes to carry out open innovation activities and tap public collective wisdom.In order to attract more people to participate and retain existing platform users,Crowdsourcing platforms need to design appropriate output sharing mechanisms in order to more effectively motivate crowds to participate Crowdsourcing Cooperation,contribute their knowledge and skills.This paper discusses the characteristics and value creation process of value co-creation in Crowdsourcing platform,establishes the corresponding value distribution model according to the unique attributes created by value creation,and explores the strength and weakness of fairness preference factors.The impact of the efforts of the task participants,and then the impact on the distribution of the enterprise value.The research shows that the fairness preference factor under the condition of information symmetry will not affect the level of public participation,and the linear payment mechanism does not have incentive effect.Under asymmetric information,the share of corporate participation in Crowdsourcing increases with the fairness preference of creators.The level of effort of creators under information asymmetry is lower than that of information symmetry,and the optimal output sharing coefficient is higher than the optimal output sharing coefficient under information symmetry,The optimal fixed payment is lower than the best fixed payment in the information state.The research in this paper will provide some reference for the enterprise's output sharing mechanism.
Keywords/Search Tags:Crowdsourcing Platform, Value Co-creation, Principal-agent Theory, Fairness Preference, Value Distribution
PDF Full Text Request
Related items