| Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)are an important part of China's economy.SMEs can create a large number of jobs and develop the national economy.Besides,SMEs can effectively promote technological innovation and maintain social stability and unity.If SMEs want to develop successfully,they must have enough money to satisfy the enterprise operation,abundant capital is the basis of enterprise behavior,including hiring talent,investment,operations,technology innovation and so on.In China's existing financial market,SMEs still use bank loans as the best financing channels.But because of the limitation of scale of SME itself,it will appear serious information asymmetry phenomenon in the process of credit.Banks tend to reduce credit risks brought by the asymmetric information,they will check small and medium-sized enterprises' loan application strictly,or to increase their lending rates to counter the risks.Faced with serious financing constraints,SMEs have searched various methods,such as obtaining financing through informal financial institutions.We can also find some phenomenon,SMEs' owners actively run in election for NPC and CPPCC,deepening ties with the party and government leaders at all levels,meanwhile,SMEs try to hire executives with banking background and political relations.SMEs hope toestablish a relationship through this informal way,in politics they can get a bit of convenience,such as problems caused by imperfect legal system and property protection,and even can get some convenience of tax incentives,financial subsidies,In the bank area,this can strengthen the link between the banks and SMEs,so that the bank can better obtain the information of the enterprise,improve the communication efficiency and reduce the degree of information asymmetry.This kind of "relationship financing" is a subject worth discussing in the real economy development.This paper also intends to study the financing constraints of SMEs from this phenomenon.On the basis of reviewing relevant literatures,this article reviews the relevant research results of domestic and foreign scholars on the issue of financing constraints in the introduction part.In the first chapter,the paper further analyzes the status quo and causes of China's SMEs' financing constraints.In the second section,the definition of financing constraints,measurement methods,and related basic theories are introduced,and at the same time shows the mechanism of SMEs' use of bank-enterprise relationship and government-enterprise relationship to ease the issue of financing constraints.On the basis of empirical research,this paper selects the private companies listed on the small-sized board as a sample to study the influence of bank-enterprise relationship and government-enterprise relationship on financing constraints of SMEs,then chooses these corporates data for 2012-2016.Put forward the four basic assumptions based on theoretical analysis,build the cash flow sensitivity of cash model,and run the panel data regression testing hypotheses,reach the corresponding four conclusions as follows,bank-enterprise relationship and government-enterprise relationship existing alone indeed can effectively alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises,and enterprises with two relationships have poorer performance than enterprises with one relationship,stronger relationship can more effectively alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises.Finally,according to the conclusions of this paper,relevant suggestions are put forward to help solve the financing constraints faced by SMEs. |