Research On The Influence Of Officials' Performance Demands On Accounting Conservatism

For a long time,China's official evaluation mechanism with economic performance as the core has given local officials incentives for promotion.Under the drive of political demands,local officials have motivation to intervene in business decision-making and accounting policy choices of enterprises in their jurisdictions.Based on the background of reconstructing the new type of government-enterprise relationship with the principle of "affinity" and "cleanliness",this paper explores the influence of officials' political demands on the interests of enterprises with different interest motives,and studies the moderating effect of government-enterprise relationship and officials' performance demand on accounting conservatism.It not only enriches the theoretical research on the influencing factors of accounting conservatism from a unique perspective,but also helps to understand the impact of macro-government behavior on the micro-enterprise economy.At the same time,it also has certain practical significance for optimizing the relationship between new government and enterprises and protecting the interests of accounting information demanders.Firstly,First of all,this paper sorts out and reviews the research status of accounting conservatism,and comprehensively uses contract theory,resource dependence theory and social relationship theory to find out the logical relationship between officials' political demands and accounting conservatism,and proposes hypotheses.Based on the existing literature,this paper divides the official performance demands into the official economic growth demand and the official financial revenue demand,and defines the relationship between government and enterprise by the nature of property rights and official executives.The relationship between government and enterprises is defined by the nature of property rights and official executives,and studies the regulatory effect of the relationship between government and enterprise.Secondly,taking the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company in 2009-2017 as a sample,theC-score model is used to obtain the accounting conservatism of listed companies.In this paper,the unbalanced panel data model is constructed.According to the nature of the adjustment variables,the group regression and hierarchical regression methods are used to demonstrate.The study found that: first,the higher the political appeal driven by the economic growth motive,the lower the accounting conservatism;and the official economic growth appeal significantly reduced the accounting conservatism of the state-owned enterprises.Second,the higher the performance appeal driven by fiscal revenue motive,the higher the accounting conservatism;and the fiscal revenue appeal of officials significantly improved the accounting conservatism of non-state-owned enterprises.Third,official executives are unable to alleviate the negative impact of official economic growth demands on accounting conservatism,and official executives have weakened the positive effect of official financial revenue claims on accounting robustness.Fourth,compared with non-promoted local officials,the promotion of economic performance appeals of officials significantly affects the soundness of corporate accounting,and the promotion of the ecological performance of officials significantly affects the soundness of corporate accounting.This paper puts forward four suggestions,including the establishment of a new four-dimensional relationship between government and enterprise,the optimization of official performance appraisal.