The Study Of Game Theory On Enterprise Financing Based On The Valuation Adjustment Mechanism

Game Theory has had a more and more extensive application in economic fields since its foundation in last carisenentury.And a large number of integrated theories and models have been.In the latest decade,Valuation Adjustment Mechanism has been prevailing as the rapid development of new economies and information technologies.The Valuation Adjustment Mechanism is an agreement between the investor and the financer.The investor can exercise a right if the promised condition occurs,and so does the financer.Actually,the VAM can be seen as an option,which can protect the investor and encourage financer.In China,with Mengniu using the VAM,many companies began to use it to finance.Yet in its use,most enterprises have to face the serious consequences.Thus research on the VAM is imminent,and the current research is mainly focused on qualitative analysis of the case,while ignoring the game behavior between the two sides.This paper from the investors,financing enterprises and their strategies use Game Theory to study the VAM,the main work is as follows:In the case of a pair of gambling,the paper has constructed the foundation game model between the investment and the financing.According to the analysis of the expected return,we should take account that what circumstances should choose the VAM,and the paper also analysis the impact of the goal difficulty and hard-working level on expected earnings for the enterprise.In the case of repeated gambling,the paper has constructed the Game Theory model of staged financing.When introducing refinancing investors,driven by the goal of maximizing individual interests,all parties will face conspiracy phenomenon.Chapter V in the paper verifies the conclusion's scientific by using matlab with some cases for further discussion.Finally,this paper have got the following conclusion:Repeat gambling structure can avoid the risk effectively and enhance the flexibility of capital operation.The VAM goal difficulty and hard-working level affect the earnings of the enterprise.In the tripartite game model,by finding the Nash equilibrium,we know that only in the case of the first round investors additional capital,refinancing investors will enter.When the first round investors collusive with refinancing investors,companies is in disadvantage during negotiation.When the financing companies collusive with refinancing investors,the financing companies should beware of some unreasonable demands of the refinancing investors to avoid falling into a trap.