Property Ownership,Accounting Conservatism And Debt Financing Costs

Debt financing is a problem that most enterprises must face in the process of development.The financing methods of enterprises include debt financing and equity financing.Because the debt financing method has tax shield effect and leverage effect,and it will not disperse the control rights of the original shareholders,it has certain advantages over the equity financing method.Therefore,many companies choose to raise funds through debt financing.As an important basic principle of accounting,accounting conservatism has an important influence on accounting theory and accounting practice.It is a hot spot for domestic and foreign scholars to study.Because accounting conservatism has the effect of reducing information asymmetry and reducing agency costs,it also affects Debt contracts,which will affect the cost of debt financing.China's enterprises are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.State-owned enterprises are controlled by the will of the government.Ownership and control rights belong to the state.Compared with non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises have the government's policy support and advantages of implicit guarantees,and are therefore more affected.The preference of investors and creditors,the nature of state-owned property rights may weaken the effect of accounting conservatism on the cost of debt financing.Based on the above analysis,this paper selects data from the 2014-2016 three-year A-share non-financial listed company in China's Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets as research samples.Under the premise of full theoretical analysis,research hypotheses are proposed to select the sample data.The empirical analysis separately studied the nature of property rights,the soundness of accounting,and the relationship between the crossover and the cost of debt financing.The content of this article is divided into six chapters.The first chapter introduces the research background,ideas and research content.Chapter 2reviews relevant literature and reviews.The third chapter defines the concept of related variables,and elaborates three theories related to the content of this study.The fourth chapter describes the research hypothesis,the variable measurement method and the design of the research model.The fifth chapter is the analysis of empirical results and draws threeconclusions:(1)The nature of property rights is significantly negatively related to the cost of debt financing.Compared to non-state-owned enterprises,state-owned enterprises have lower debt financing costs.(2)The accounting conservatism is significantly negatively related to the cost of debt financing.(3)The nature of property rights will have a regulatory effect on the effect of accounting conservatism on debt financing costs.The nature of state-owned property rights weakens the degree of negative influence of accounting conservatism on debt financing costs.The entire sample was divided into state-owned enterprise groups and non-state-owned enterprise groups.When returning to accounting conservatism and debt financing costs respectively,it was found that the two groups were negatively related but not significant in the state-owned enterprise groups;both were significantly negative in the non-state-owned enterprise groups.Relevance further explains the role of property rights in the regulation of the two.The sixth chapter summarizes the conclusions of the study,and proposes targeted suggestions for reducing the debt financing costs of listed companies based on the conclusions of the research.Finally,the shortcomings of this study are pointed out,and further research directions are pointed out accordingly.