Study On The Monetary Policy And Bank's Risk-taking

In the past 10 years after the subprime mortgage crisis,the central banks of all countries have adopted a monetary policy of long-term low interest rate policy in order to safeguard their own economic stability.At the same time,due to the natural characteristic of financial intermediaries and the long-term low interest rate policy of the central bank,the market expectation that "financial markets lack liquidity,central banks cut interest rates",has led to financial intermediation through credit leverage and excessive risk exposure,which has seriously affected the stability of the financial system.In the post-crisis era,central banks in various countries gradually explored the relationship between monetary policy and financial stability,and preventing systemic financial risks is once again receiving widespread attention.The non-neutrality of the risk of financial intermediation has also stimulated the research on the theory of risk-taking channel of monetary policy.In recent years,central banks in various countries have discovered that monetary policies that only use price stability as a single objective cannot always guarantee the stability of the financial system in the review of the subprime mortgage crisis.With the implementation of international financial regulatory reform,macro-prudential supervision policies have also received corresponding attention.The revision of the Basel ?,centered on the reform of capital and liquidity supervision,has established a more complete banking supervision system.Based on this,studying the mechanism and conduction effect of the bank's risk-taking channel in the new regulatory period,and rationalizing the logical relationship between bank supervision and monetary policy,have a strong practical significance.As the international banking industry enters a new phase of dual constraints of capital and liquidity,the combined effect of the two will inevitably lead to adjustments and variability in the micro-management characteristics of banks,and may lead to changes in the effects of monetary policies based on bank transmissions.At the same time,double-constrained supervision will also change the term structure of bank balance sheets,thereby smoothing bank excess risk-taking behaviors brought about by fluctuations in the business cycle.Firstly,this paper takes the time as the axis,reviews the development of capital and liquidity constraints and the development of monetary policy risk-taking.Based on the review of the literature,this paper will construct a simple theoretical model under double constraints.Based on the dynamic non-equilibrium panel data of 78 commercial banks in China during the period of 2010-2016,the first-order system GMM method was used to empirically test the changes in the risk-taking channel of monetary policy under double constraints,and to explore the impact of double constraints on the transmission of monetary policy.This study explores the impact and influence of double constraints on the transmission of monetary policy,and improves China's monetary policy transmission theory,in order to provide some reference for China's monetary policy and macro-prudential dual-pillar regulatory framework.The results of this study show that:(1)the bank's risk exposure under the dual constraints of capital and liquidity continues to exist,and with the loosening of monetary policy,the risk appetite of banks will increase accordingly.As a whole,at present,there is still a phenomenon of "Too big to fall" in China.Large commercial banks have better risk buffering mechanisms than small and medium-sized banks,and therefore have a stronger risk appetite;(2)The empirical data of China's commercial banks show that the synergistic effects of double-constraint supervision far outweigh the offsetting efifects,so the combined effect of double constraints will lead to a weakening of banks' willingness to take risks,and the implementation of non-interest-based businesses will help improve the bank's risk exposure level;(3)The effects of different types and intensities of monetary policy under the dual constraints of capital and liquidity on the risk-taking channel through the micro-features of banks are not symmetrical.Dual-constrained supervision has brought uncertainty to the conduction of monetary policy.Therefore,the supervisory authorities and monetary policy authorities should pay attention to the disturbance of the regulatory policy adjustment to the conduction of monetary policy,restructure the monetary policy system in the conflict and coordination between the macro-prudential supervision policy and the monetary policy,and increase the effectiveness of monetary policies with the pertinence and synergy of monetary policy,in order to better ensure targeted,forward-looking and effective macro financial regulation.