Research On The Termination Effect In The Implementation Of Local Regional Economic Planning

Regional economic planning plays an important role in guiding and promoting the development of the regional economy.The smooth and sustainable effect of regional economic planning directly affects the speed and quality of regional economic development,which is of great importance to the development of the regional economy.Since the Ninth Five-Year Plan,the nation has continuously introduced a series of strategies aimed at promoting the development of the regional economy.Until the later period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan,up to 20 regional economic plans have risen to the national level.However,the effect of the implementation of regional economic planning is difficult to continue in reality.For example,the decreasing trend of marginal effect and short duration of implementation effect in the process of planning and implementation affect the sustainable development of regional economy.Although the process of formulating the planning is scientific and rational,the main body of the implementation is the limited rational individual.Near the termination,the behavioral preference of the planner is reverse and finally reduces the effect of the implementation of the planning.This phenomenon is the end-game-effect in the implementation of the planning.The end-game-effect not only reduces the effect of the implementation of planning,but also may cause economic fluctuations,affect the normal production and life of people.Moreover,it is not conducive to the long-term sustainable development of regional economy and social harmony and stability.Therefore,it is important to confirm the end-game-effect in the implementation of regional economic planning,and to find a way to alleviate or weaken the end-game-effect,which is of great guiding and practical importance to promote the long-term stable and sustainable development of regional economy.In dealing with the problem of the end-game-effect,traditional economics generally adopts the fuzzy termination time or makes the termination time unclear so that the behavioral subject cannot know the clear termination time,and then avoid the occurrence of short-term behavior.However,this solution has a certain defect in the practical application.Without a clear termination,there will be no clear goal guide,which is not conducive to the realization of the final goal of regional economic planning.However,behavioral economics,based on the hypothesis of limited rationality,has a certain advantage in dealing with the end-game-effect from the perspective of mutual trust and reciprocity between the subjects of behavior.This paper first analyzes the existence of the end-game-effect in the implementation of regional economic planning in theory by using the theory of limited repetition game,and explains the reasons for the existence of the end-game-effect in combination with the hyperbolic discounted utility theory of behavioral economics.Secondly,based on the empirical analysis of the 11th Five-Year and 12th Five-Year Plan of 15 sub-provincial cities in China,this paper further demonstrates the existence of the end-game-effect in the implementation of planning.Finally,we use the experiment of the trust game of experimental economics to explore the solution of the end-game-effect.In the specific settings of the experiment,we added an information intervention of the reference point to distinguish the influence of different reciprocal behaviors on individual behavioral decision.Through theoretical analysis,the hypotheses are put forward and tested through laboratory experiments of the trust game,and the following conclusions are drawn:(1)From the overall point of view,the end-game-effect is significant.Both sides of the game,whether initiator or responder,contribute significantly lower than the initial stage of the experiment.(2)The construction of positive reciprocal relationship weakens the end-game-effect to a certain extent,and the negative reciprocal relationship strengthens the end-game-effect to a certain extent.Under the positive reciprocal relationship,the contribution value of the two sides of the game is relatively small at the end of the experiment.(3)A positive reciprocal relationship further weakens the end-game-effect compared with those without positive reciprocal relations.There are two innovations in the study of the end-game-effect in the implementation of regional economic planning:(1)perspective innovation:the existence of the end-game-effect in the implementation of planning is found from the perspective of planning term,which enriches the research on the uneven effect of the implementation of regional economic planning;(2)method innovation:the method of experimental economics is introduced about how to solve the end-game-effect.The related design of laboratory experiments can make up for the shortcomings and limitations of data in reality,and provide a more reliable reference for the formulation of realistic policies.