Director Network Center Degree?member Characteristics And Large Shareholders Tunneling

The vigorous development of the capital market has enhanced economic vitality and provided enterprises with abundant resources.As an important part of the capital market,the improvement of listed companies' quality,and the strengthening of their competitiveness also contribute to the capital market.However,along with the promotion of economic development,there are also some problems,such as the majority of the capital system in the modern enterprise system,which gives greater power to the majority shareholders who control most of the capital,and is likely to cause the situation in which large shareholders take over the interests of small and medium shareholders.From the early “Monkey King incident” and “San Jiu incident” to the recent “Le TV ”,“ST Bao Qian Li”,the act of short-listing the listed company by major shareholders has always been a stubborn disease in the A-share market,and its tunneling method has also shifted from the initial capital occupation to dividend policy,private placement,connected transactions and so on.External supervision such as the policies and laws issued by related departments,limited market restrictions did not eliminate this phenomenon.Therefore,it is of great significance to discuss and research from the perspective of internal governance of the company,in particular from its core board of directors' inhibition of the tunneling of large shareholders.The function of the board of directors is fundamentally its personal behavior and is embedded in the social network of directors.The governance behavior of directors is affected by the social network in which they are located.This social network is an informal mechanism that can compensate for the deficiencies of the formal mechanism to some extent.This article aims to explore the relationship between the degree of directorial network centering and the tunneling of major shareholders from this perspective.This article focuses on the relationship between the degree of network of directors and the tunneling of large shareholders.It also considers the impact of different board member characteristics on the relationship between the degree of directorial network center and the tunneling of large shareholders.Using the combination of normative analysis method and empirical research method,the relevant literature was first combed and summarized,relying on social network theory,reputation mechanism,resource dependence theory,and high-level echelon theory to analyze the effect of the degree of director network center on the tunneling of large shareholders.Second,build a model of the relationship between the director network and the major shareholder.At the same time,taking into account the influence of individual characteristics on the behavior of directors,the introduction of the characteristics of the members of the board of directors,respectively build a model of the influence of the chain of directors on gender,financial legal background and the proportion of higher education background on the degree of directorial network center and the major shareholder tunneling relationship.Taking the listed companies in Jiangsu,Zhejiang and Shanghai as research samples from 2014 to 2016,and using MATLAB software to preprocess the network data of the directors to form the enterprise-level chain enterprise matrix,this model matrix is imported into the specialized computing network UCINET for calculation.Finally,all data was processed using EXCEL and STATA software to verify the hypothesis.The theoretical analysis and empirical test results show that the higher the centrality of the director network,the stronger the inhibitory effect on the tunneling of large shareholders.At the same time,the percentage of female directors,the proportion of directors with financial and legal backgrounds,and the proportion of directors with higher education level have a certain negative reinforcement effect on the relationship between the degree of directorial network center and the tunneling of large shareholders.This article is based on the perspective of the director network formed by the director and taking into account the impact of its role in the supervision and decision-making of the board of directors,and discusses its influence mechanism on the tunneling of large shareholders.At the same time,it adds the variables which reflect characteristics of the board members and extends the personal characteristics to the corporate level.It has enriched the relevant research literature and provided empirical evidence for restraining the tunneling of major shareholders and protecting the interests of small and medium investors.It is also beneficial to the governance of the board of directors,the construction of the board of directors,and the optimal allocation of the board members.It is appropriate to adjust the gender ratio of the board of directors and further strengthen their professional skills so as to give certain inspiration to the purpose of improving the effectiveness of governance.