A Case Study On Information Disclosure Quality Based On Ultimate Controller’s Ownership Characteristics

As a collection of contracts,listed companies are associated with shareholders,managers,workers,customers,government agencies and other social stakeholders.When making decisions related to listed companies,each individuals of there groups will use all kinds of information the company has disclosed.As listed companies constitute the main body of the securities market,as the link between stock price and the true value of the enterprise,the quality of information disclosure will directly affect the securities market as well as the allocation of resources.However,the behavior of information disclosure is not always perfect,whether it is in the western countries where the stock market is developing earlier or the less developed countries.In China,listed companies using information disclosure to practice embezzlement or irregular behavior also occur from time to time.Therefore,how to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies in China has gradually become the focus of academic attention.When La Porta et al proposed the ultimate control theory in 1999,scholars turned the focus of corporate governance from the first type of agency problem to the proxy problem of the controlling shareholder and the medium and small shareholders,that is,the second type of agency problem.And the existence of the ultimate controller for the behavior of listed companies has a very significant impact on the decision,so this article take Tianshou Development as a case study,take the ultimate controller and the control-ownership wedge as the starting point,analyses the he nature of the ultimate controller and the wedge between control rights and cash-flow right,and how there two facts will effect the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.Then explore how to improve the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.This article takes the public data and reports of Tianshou Development(stock code 000611)as the research object,listed the ownership structure,looked for its ultimate controller,and analyzes its nature as well as the control-ownership wedge and ownership concentration,then combine these with company’s management status and information disclosure behavior,to analysis how the ultimate controller’s ownership characteristics could effect the quality of information disclosure of listed companies.Finally,through case analysis,this article shows that the key to improve information disclosure quality of listed companies is to optimize the ownership structure,when there is an ultimate controller,the introduction of multi-control balances the ultimate controller’s control rights,thereby minimize the gap between each shareholders right to acquire information.In addition,encourage small and medium shareholders to participate in corporate governance,strengthen the sense of ownership of small and medium shareholders,while improving the independent directors and board of supervisors throughout the board of directors are conducive to improve the quality of information disclosure.