| With the development of economic globalization,there are problems of overcapacity arise in many companies,so they hope to change the status quo,realize industrial integration and optimized allocation of resources through overseas investment.Moreover,Corporate executives are keen to initiate cross-border mergers and acquisitions,because generally speaking,the expansion of the company’s scale can often increase managers’ remuneration.Thus,the capital market set off a wave of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.However,the cross-border mergers and acquisitions behavior of many enterprises did not help them get rid of the trend of declining performance,nor did they improve their operating performance.Cases of failure caused by blind mergers and acquisitions does not occur rarely.Effective internal control environment can help enterprises achieve industrial integration through cross-border mergers and acquisitions successfully.So as an enterprise management personnel,the importance of senior executives in the decision-making process of cross-border mergers and acquisitions is self-evident.With the gradual completion of the reform of China’s shareholder structure,more and more owners of listed companies have proposed to let senior executives hold shares in the company in order to mitigate the conflicts of interests between interests and operators.How to solve the problem of optimizing the utility of managerial ownership as an equity incentive mechanism,and applying the shareholding effect of senior executives to cross-border mergers and acquisitions of companies,in order to improve the operational performance after the completion of mergers and acquisitions,needs to be further discussed.By reviewing the relevant literature,it can be concluded that most of the current researches are based on separate discussion of managerial ownership and cross-border mergers and acquisitions as independent areas.This paper analysis the influence factors of cross-border mergers and acquisitions performance mainly from the perspective of the macro-environment and market background of host country and home country,study whether the performance of main enterprise after mergers and acquisitions is improved.Researches and analysis of companies’ performance after cross-border mergers and acquisitions from the viewpoint of managerial ownership is still relatively small,and no mature theoretical framework has been established yet.In addition,from the study of the influence of managerial ownership on the performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions,it is found that different nature of the company and degree of ownership concentration can also make the final conclusions different.In this paper,109 cross-border mergers and acquisitions events in China’s A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2015 are used as research samples.Using the proportion of senior managerial ownership as an explanatory variable,the Cumulative Abnormal Return(CAR)and Buy And Hold Abnormal Return(BHAR)after the company’s mergers and acquisitions activity are selected as evaluation indicators for short-term cross-border M&A performance and long-term cross-border mergers and acquisitions performance.And then establish regression models to verify the effect of managerial ownership on the short-term performance and long-term performance of Chinese enterprises’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions.At the same time,the two regulatory variables of enterprise nature and ownership concentration are introduced to analyze whether they will make an influence on the effect of managerial ownership.Through empirical research,the following three conclusions are drawn:(1)There is no significant correlation between managerial ownership and short-term performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Chinese enterprises,but the managerial ownership has a positive effect on the long-term performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in Chinese enterprises.(2)The positive effect of the managerial ownership in non-state holding enterprises on long-term performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions is significantly stronger than that of state-owned enterprises.(3)The higher the degree of ownership concentration of the enterprises,the weaker the positive effect of managerial ownership on the long-term performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. |