Research On The Impact Of Short-selling Securities On The Risk-taking Of Listed Companies

On March 31,2010,the relaxation of short-selling securities in China officially ended the unilateral trading model in China's securities market.Our country constantly adjusts the stocks that are short selling and short selling.From the initial 90 constituent stocks of the Shanghai Composite 50 Index and Shenzhen Composite Index stocks to September 2014,the number of short-selling short-selling targets has increased to 900.The balance of securities lending also rose from 11,011,100 yuan in 2010 to 832,158.73 yuan in 2014.The increasing frequency of short selling and short selling activities has also increased the controversy of the trading mechanism.The short selling of short selling in the stock market was considered one of the factors that put pressure on stock prices in the fall of the Chinese stock market in 2015.Therefore,in 2015,China imposed some restrictions on short selling and short selling,and then gradually lifted restrictions.With the continuous expansion of short selling short selling and short selling,the number of short-selling and short selling transactions continues to increase,and the short selling and short selling system has a greater impact on capital markets and corporate governance.Research on short-selling short selling began to increase,but the opening of the domestic short selling short-selling system was relatively late,and related research has yet to be enriched,and most of them focused on the effect of short selling short selling on capital market pricing efficiency and enhancing information flow.However,there are still some studies that focus on the effects of short selling and short selling on corporate restatements,corporate cash value,and corporate investment decisions.The choice of corporate risk taking level is an important part of corporate governance,and it is related to the viability of the company and its future development prospects.Based on the above background,this paper mainly studies the effect of the short-selling short-selling system on listed companies' risk-taking and its differences.The research in this paper links the capital market pressure caused by the short-selling and short-selling system with corporate governance,and can test whether the performance of the capital market can be transmitted to the real economy and affect the risk-taking level of the enterprise.The system design and corporate governance will be as follows Important significance:(1)It is conducive to perfecting supporting systems related to short selling and short selling;(2)It is conducive to strengthening the internal governance mechanism of enterprises;(2)It is beneficial to enterprises to choose the appropriate level of risk-taking.The research thinking of this article follows the ideas from theoretical research to empirical research,policy recommendations and research prospects.First of all,through theoretical research to clarify the mechanism of the short-selling short-selling system on corporate risk-taking,and analyze the possible impact effects,this paper puts forward three research hypotheses.Then,this article uses a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2016,and borrows the external event of partial open-end short selling and short selling,and uses short-term fixed-effect models and double-difference models to sell short-selling at different macro levels.An empirical study of the impacts and differences of corporate risk taking under the economic conditions and the nature of ownership.Finally,this paper draws conclusions based on empirical analysis,confirms the three research hypotheses and makes policy recommendations based on the findings.Through theoretical research and analysis of influencing mechanism,this paper believes that short selling short selling mainly influences corporate risk taking through the increase of risk aversion tendencies of managers and easing of managerial person's opportunistic behavior.Through successive empirical studies,we found that allowing short-selling short-selling reduces the level of corporate risk-taking,but this effect has differences in the significance of different corporate ownership and macroeconomic conditions.Specifically:(1)From the perspective of the overall Chinese listed companies,allowing listed companies to open short-selling securities reduces the risk exposure of the company.The short-selling short-selling system does have a significant impact on corporate governance.The understanding of short selling short selling should be viewed from a broader perspective.(2)Allowing short-sell short selling to reduce the level of risk exposure of listed companies is mainly reflected in state-owned listed companies.The reduction in the level of risk exposure of listed companies by short selling by short selling and short selling has performed significantly for state-owned listed companies and has not played a significant role in non-state listed companies.(3)The effect of allowing short-selling and short selling to reduce the level of risk exposure of state-owned listed companies is mainly reflected in the period of macroeconomic downturn.During the period of macroeconomic prosperity,whether state-owned or non-state-owned enterprises,the effects of short selling by short selling or short selling have no significant effect on corporate risk taking.In the period of macroeconomic downturn,the effect of short selling and short selling on state-owned enterprises was significant,but the effect on non-state-owned enterprises was not significant.Based on the research conclusions of this paper,this paper puts forward the following policy recommendations:(1)Expansion of the short-selling pool and the selection of the target companies with caution.According to the study of this article,short-selling short-selling reduces the level of corporate risk-taking,while too low a level of risk-taking is not conducive to the long-term development of the company.Therefore,when expanding the pool of short selling and short selling,you should be more cautious about alternative companies,especially state-owned listed companies.(2)Improve the internal governance mechanism of state-owned enterprises.A sound internal oversight mechanism can weaken the effect of the short-selling and short-selling system on the risk reduction level of the enterprise and alleviate the principal-agent problem.An effective incentive mechanism can avoid managers' tendency to risk aversion due to short-selling and short-selling,and keep the company's risk commitment at a reasonable level.(3)Improve the incentive system for non-state-owned enterprises that do not have "double identity".Non-state-owned enterprises that do not have "dual identities" may face threats of short selling by short-selling securities that may cause managers to choose projects that are lower than the level of reasonable risk exposure.A more comprehensive incentive system can better exert the manager's initiative and make managers more effective.The goal of people and shareholders is consistent,prompting managers to choose the right level of risk for the company.(4)When the macroeconomic downturn occurs,appropriate restrictions are imposed on short selling and short selling.During the period of macroeconomic downturn,short-selling short-selling can significantly reduce the level of risk-taking of state-owned enterprises,thereby making the state-owned enterprises with lower levels of risk-taking more deviated from the appropriate level of risk-taking.