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Institutional Ownership,Auditor Selection And Earnings Management Of Listed Companies

Posted on:2019-04-16Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R L ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330566499710Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the new era,China's macro-economic growth rate has been greatly improved,and the development of capital market has become more mature and stable.The vast majority of investors make decisions through the financial information disclosed by listed companies.In order to attract investment,the company often has the motive to carry out the earnings manipulation to create a good operating effect.Earnings management has seriously affected the real reliability of accounting information,misled investors' decisions and interfered with the normal operation of the market.Because it's huge quantity and professional advantage,Chinese securities market have issued much guidelines to encourage the development of institutional investors.But the question is how could it in line with market expectations to play an effective role in corporate governance and suppressing the earnings manipulation behavior?The existing literature has mixed reviews on the governance effect of institutional investors.And the auditor choice as an effective external governance mechanism can also have a certain supervisory role for the authenticity of enterprise accounting information.This study is to distinguish the heterogeneity of institutional shareholders and find how they arise influence on earnings manipulation,if it's the inhibition,whether it through influence the auditor choice to achieve.Based on China's relevant data of A-share listed companies as research samples,build the model and the empirical analysis and found that: institutional investor shareholding and corporate earnings management has certain relevance.If there are more pressure sensitive institutional shareholders,it will improve the company's earnings management degree.If there are more pressure resistance institutional shareholders,it would significantly reduce the degree of earnings management of the company.A study of pressure resistant institutional shareholders found that the more shares they held,the more likely they were to choose high-quality "big four" or "top ten" accounting firms.Finally,the mediation effect is proved by the method of mediating effect.This paper is conducive to further promoting the healthy development of the stakeholders.
Keywords/Search Tags:Corporate governance, Earning management, Institutional ownership, Auditor selection
PDF Full Text Request
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