| CEO is an important role in the deciding strategic direction and choosing strategic decision,and the successor of CEO affects the formation and change of enterprise strategy to a great extent.It is in virtue of the differences in background,character and ability between the former CEO and the successor CEO,which leads to a significant difference in the concept of enterprise management.This difference gives the enterprise a great opportunity to break away from the original constraint and carry out the strategic transformation.The higher order theory and the promise upgrading theory believe that the long-term CEO will be embedded in the existing conditions and projects of the company.However,the new CEO will not adhere to the current management set,and will help enterprises to overcome the long-term strategic rigidity,thus developing a more suitable path.But at the same time,the problem of quick victory related to the succession of CEO and earnings management implemented to alleviate the pressure of quick victory are gradually emerging.In the face of the quick win pressure,the new CEO has a very strong motivation to adjust the allocation of resources in order to improve the company's performance and competence in a short time after taking up the post,that is,the real activity earnings management behavior,in order to alleviate the multiple performance pressures from the internal and external management,and at the same time set up the prestige of its leadership in the enterprise.It is one of the important means for CEO to manipulate earnings by adjusting the R&D expenditure of enterprises to manage earnings in real activities..In recent years,more and more attention has been paid to the R&D capability of enterprises by owners and managers.Nowadays,China has entered a new period of development planning,the attention that people paid to R&D innovation is growing,and the strong and weak innovation ability of the enterprise is becoming one of the most important standards to measure the value and development prospects of the enterprise.Under this background,CEO has the full reason to adjust the investment related to the enterprise and R&D by adjusting the strategic direction,so as to achieve the purpose of the implementation of the earnings management.Accordingly,the research on earnings management of R&D expenditure has been gradually rising.These studies believe that R&D expenditure is a means of earnings management for enterprises,and management can meet their own interests by manipulating R&D expenditure.In this paper,the real activity earnings management of R&D expenditure is selected as an explanatory variable,and it is also to explore whether this phenomenon does exist with the management of the enterprise,especially in the CEO decision.In the face of possible earnings management of R&D expenditure,the monitoring mechanism of CEO is particularly important.More attention has been paid to external supervision,namely,the deterrent effect of shareholders and the board of directors on CEO,but this article believes that the non CEO managers from the management layer also have the motivation to contract the earnings management behavior of CEO for the maintenance of the professional reputation and the future career,and this motivation and non CEO management.The relative age of these managers is directly related to their CEO counterparts,which represents their ability to check and balance CEO.Therefore,this paper selects the internal balance of management as an adjustment variable and tries to study its regulatory role on the relationship between "CEO successor and R&D expenditure earnings management".In the empirical test,this paper uses OLS and Tobit models to conduct regression respectively.The results show that CEO succession is significant negative correlated with R&D expenditure and is significant positive correlated with R&D expenditure earnings management.When the internal balance of management is introduced as an adjustment variable,it can be found that the managerial internal balances is significantly negatively related to the management of R&D expenditure earnings management,the intersection of regulatory variables and explanatory variables and R&D expenditure earnings.The residual management is significant positive correlation.Specifically,in the year of CEO succession in the enterprise,its R&D expenditure decreased significantly,and the real activity earnings management related to R&D expenditure increased significantly,while the internal balance of management would significantly reduce the activity of R&D surplus management caused by the CEO successor.In robustness test,the above regression results have not changed significantly,indicating that the conclusions of this study are robust.Finally,in further research,we find that earnings management related to R&D expenditure will significantly reduce firm value.The innovation points of this paper are as follows:first,it provides a new perspective for the related research of enterprise innovation,and breaks out the original formula that relies on the value of R&D expenditure as the research object,and the real activity earnings management of R&D expenditure as the proxy variable of the strategic intention of enterprise innovation.Second,the existing research on the supervision after the CEO succession is more concerned about external supervision,that is,the role of the board of directors,and this paper puts forward a new perspective on the role of corporate governance in the supervision of the new CEO,that is,the perspective of the internal supervision of the management level,and studies the checks and balances of other non CEO managers in CEO.Third,according to most of the previous studies,all the members of the management layer are considered as a whole to study it's interaction with the outside world.However,this paper tries to divide different levels of management layers into different subjects and tries to study the different roles of different levels in each company,providing a new direction to develop management related research. |
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