Research On The Influence Of Board Characteristics On The Company's Non-efficiency Investment

Under the conditions of the market economy,investment plays an extremely important role in the national economy,social development and international exchanges.The scale of investment is one of the "troikas" that drive economic growth.With the gradual expansion of the investment scale of listed companies in China,it is difficult to avoid the problem of non-efficiency investment.Under the background that China's economy has begun to enter the "new normal",the expansion of investment scale has gradually slowed down the growth of certain industries and fields in the national economy.The reason is still the company's inefficient investment behavior,mainly as over-investment and under-investment.Investment can optimize the company's resource allocation,which is the root of the company's continuation and growth.It will not only affect the company's value creation,but also have a long-term impact on promoting technological progress and macroeconomic growth.Once the company has unreasonable investment behavior,whether it is excessive investment or insufficient investment,it will not only be detrimental to the sustainable development of the company,but also cause great waste of social resources and negative impact on the overall interests of the society.Therefore,how to restrain the company's non-efficiency investment behavior has become an urgent problem to be solved in China's current economic development.The separation of corporate ownership and management rights has led to the inevitable emergence of the board of directors.With the continuous evolution and development of modern companies,the board system in its organizational structure is also becoming more and more perfect.The board of directors is the company's operational decision-making body,a bridge connecting shareholders and management,and a core hub in corporate governance.From the existing research results,the research on board governance mainly focuses on the board of directors capital,director network,background features of independent directors,etc.,and the structure features of the board of directors from a macro perspective,such as the number of board officers and the ratio of independent directors to the board of directorate.The study depth of the two-in-one and the directors' compensation incentives is slightly shallow.These board characteristics cover its internal structure and its externalized performance.It is an important prerequisite and foundation for effectively playing the role of the board's governance mechanism,which affects the governance of the board and the efficiency of corporate governance,and affects the level of company's inefficient investment further.Based on this,this paper is based on China's current market environment and existing literature at home and abroad,through the combination of theoretical deduction and empirical testing,with principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,modern housekeeping theory and resource dependence theory.For the theoretical analysis of the entry point,focusing on the structural characteristics of the board of directors and the salary incentive characteristics of the board of directors,the empirical data of Chinese A-share listed companies in 2010-2016 is used as a research sample to empirically test the characteristics of the board of directors and the company's non-efficiency investment.The relationship between them to verify'the important role that board governance plays in corporate governance.On the one hand,this study broadens the research on board governance,which has certain theoretical guiding significance for perfecting the modern board system.On the other hand,this paper improves the relationship between board characteristics and non-efficiency investment,which promotes the company's sustainable development.It has some important inspiration.Based on the four basic theories,this paper puts forward the research hypothesis,constructs the model,and uses the empirical research method to test the influence of the board characteristics of China's Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies on non-efficiency investment.The specific research framework is as follows:The first part is an introduction.This part mainly elaborates the research background of this paper,and finds out the theory of meaning and practical value of studying the influence of the board characteristics of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies on the company's non-efficiency investment.At the same time,it also describes the research content,research ideas and innovations of this paper.The second part is a literature review.Firstly,the author introduces the literature research results of the domestic and foreign researchers on the features of the board and the company's performance,earnings management and investment efficiency,and then comprehensively evaluate them,and then put forward the viewpoint of this paper.The third part is the theoretical analysis and hypothesis.Firstly,the relevant core concepts are defined.Then,the four basic theories supported by this paper are elaborated and taken as the starting point.Based on the perspectives of board governance and corporate governance,the characteristics of the board of directors are analyzed theoretically and logically.The impact is ultimately based on the proposed research hypothesis.The fourth part is the study design.The paper illustrates the selection of samples and data sources and screening basis.Secondly,according to the relevant domestic and foreign research literature,the variable design of the relevant main variables and the selection of control variables are determined,and the research model is finally established.The fifth part is the empirical test and the result analysis.The paper contains descriptive statistics and analysis and correlation analysis of all variables in the model,as well as model regression conclusions and analysis.Finally,the robustness of the model is tested.The sixth part is the conclusions and recommendations of the study.Based on the research conclusions of this paper,this part probes in depth the suggestions for promoting the governance of the board of directors,thus restraining the company's non-efficiency investment behavior.Finally,it puts forward the shortcomings of this paper and the deeper research prospects in the future.The research in this paper finds that the size of the board of directors is significantly negatively correlated with the non-efficiency investment.The duality is positively correlated with the inefficient investment significantly,and there is no significant correlation between the proportion of independent directors and directors'compensation and non-efficiency investments.By dividing non-efficiency investment into over-investment and under-investment,the paper finds that the characteristics of the board mainly affect the company's over-investment,in which the size of the board of directors and the proportion of independent directors are significantly negatively correlated with over-investment,and the duality and over-investment are significant.Positive correlation,directors' compensation and over-investment coefficient are negative but not significantly related;in addition,the proportion of independent directors is significantly positively correlated with insufficient investment,and the remaining characteristics are not significantly correlated with insufficient investment.By grouping Chinese listed companies according to the nature of property rights,the study found that in the state-owned and non-state-owned listed companies,the impact of the duality and directors'compensation on non-efficiency investment exists sharp distinction,and the other characteristics have no significant difference in the impact of non-efficiency investment.The tentative innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in:First,most of the existing literature focuses on the research of board characteristics and company performance,earnings management,etc,,and pays less attention to the relationship between it and non-efficiency investment.The research in this paper can further make existing theories and research results.Relevant proofs and tentative academic contributions.Second,the existing literature on the impact of board characteristics on non-efficiency investments is primarily a full-sample study.Considering the special institutional background of China,the mechanism of the influence of board characteristics on the company's non-efficiency investment under different property rights is discussed.This can provide targeted policy recommendations for improving the investment efficiency of listed companies in China.