| Investment plays a vital role in the development of macro-society and the value of micro-enterprise.The low investment efficiency will seriously affect social development and corporate value.Due to the establishment of the modern enterprise system,the ownership of enterprises is separated from the management rights,and the problem of principal-agent has begun to arise.Enterprise managers not only have specific control rights but also have residual control rights.Because managers and shareholders have inconsistent objective functions,principal-agent conflicts and information asymmetry benefits enable managers to maximize their personal interests and use their own powers to conduct non-efficiency investment behaviors.Damage to corporate value and shareholders’ rights.Financial flexibility is one of the important strategies for financial management of enterprises.The moderate flexibility of enterprises can make enterprises face external shocks and better grasp favorable investment opportunities when the environment is uncertain.That is,appropriate financial flexibility of reserves can improve the efficiency of enterprise irnvestment.However,the financial flexibility of corporate reserves may also exacerbate the principal-agent conflict,and management uses the increased cash flow for inefficient investment behavior.Enterprises with different property rights have different financing constraints,and the increase in financial flexibility has different effects on management power and non-efficiency investment.This paper studies the relationship between management power and non-efficiency investment from the perspective of financial flexibility,and draws different conclusions according to the nature of corporate property rights.This paper selects the Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed company from 2007 to 2017 as the research object,and the absolute value of the residual of the improved Richardson(2006)model is used as the measure of the inefficient investment of the explanatory variable in this paper,because the non-efficiency investment measurement model needs to lag.The first period and the management period is only disclosed to 2016,so the final research interval of this paper is the 2008-2016 nine-year data.The empirical results show that:(1)There is a positive correlation between formal management power and non-efficiency investment.(2)There is a negative correlation between management informal power and non-efficiency investment.(3)There is a positive correlation between the overall management power(comprehensive indicators of formal and informal powers through principal component analysis)and the non-efficiency investment.(4)The higher the financial flexibility of the enterprise,the management with formal power further conducts non-efficiency investment behavior,and this relationship is more prominent in non-state-owned enterprises.(5)The higher the financial flexibility of the enterprise,the management with informal power further conducts efficiency investment behavior,and this relationship is more prominent in non-state-owned enterprises.(6)The higher the financial flexibility of the enterprise,the comprehensive management power to further carry out non-efficiency investment behavior,and this relationship is more prominent in non-state-owned enterprises.The research in this paper has certain guiding significance for enterprises to establish the idea of moderate reserve financial flexibility and rational allocation of management power to improve the investment efficiency of enterprises. |
