Research On Superfund Raising,Management Power And Investment Efficiency

The Growth Enterprise Market is mainly to provide financing channels for small and medium-sized enterprises that have high growth and high risk and cannot be listed on the main board market,and meet the capital needs of entrepreneurial and growth companies in the future development.The GEM market is a complement to the main board market and plays an important role in the capital market.In the enterprises listed on the GEM IPO from 2009 to 2012,there was a widespread phenomenon of over-raised financing.All the 36 companies that successfully listed in2009 all had different levels of super-funding,high issue price,high price-earnings ratio and The over-raised funds triggered a “listing boom” in the GEM market,attracting more companies to rush to go public,and the number of companies listed on the GEM in 2010 was suddenly increasing,and the level of over-raising was more serious than in 2009.It can be seen that although the over-financing financing solves the financing problem of SMEs,it may also cause problems that are not conducive to the development of the company and the capital market.Researches on over-raised financing at home and abroad mainly focus on two aspects: one is the study of the causes of over-raising;the other is the study of over-financing and investment efficiency.Combining management power analysis,the relationship between over-funding and investment efficiency is very rare.Compared with the main board listed companies,GEM listed companies can't compare with the main board market in terms of company size,management level and governance level.The governance structure of listed companies on the GEM has certain defects.The situation of the chairman and the general manager is quite common.Although the number of independent directors is in line with the relevant regulations of the state,the salary level of independent directors of some listed companies is far less than the salary level of senior executives.The supervision of independent directors may not be as expected.This may lead to the fact that the listed companies of the GEM are in the company's operation and management activities,the management power exceeds the reasonable scope and limits,and the influence of the board of directors in the corporateIV governance mechanism is excessively affected.The ability to bind management isweakened.Executives tend to be able to obtain more private-income projects when making investment decisions,regardless of whether the investment projects can increase corporate value,and the existence of over-raised financing increases the impact of management power on non-efficiency investments,and increases Executives gain space for private benefits.Therefore,the effect of super-financing and management power on the investment efficiency of IPO of listed companies on the GEM is worthy of research and attention.The research ideas and contents of this paper are as follows: Chapter 1,Introduction: This paper introduces the research background,research significance,research content,research methods and innovations.Chapter 2,Literature Review:Combining research results and conclusions at home and abroad,and reviewing and commenting on the relationship between the causes of over-financing,the relationship between over-funding and investment efficiency,and the relationship between management power and investment efficiency.Chapter 3,Theoretical Basis and Research Hypothesis: It mainly analyzes four aspects: information asymmetry theory,principal-agent theory,investment-cash flow theory and management power theory.Based on different theories,it analyzes super-financing,management power and The relationship between investment efficiency and the research hypothesis.Firstly,super-financing leads to over-investment after corporate IPO,and over-raised financing is positively related to over-investment;Secondly,super-financing leads to insufficient investment after IPO,and over-raised Financing is not directly related to insufficient investment;Thirdly,the greater the power of management,the more serious the non-efficiency investment of the enterprise;Fourthly,the higher the degree of over-raising,the greater the power of management,and the more serious the non-efficiency investment of the enterprise.Chapter 4,Research Design: Modeling,defining variables,and selecting sample data.Chapter 5 empirical test results and analysis,empirically study the relationship between super-financing and investment efficiency of GEM listed companies from the perspective of management power,firstly,a simple descriptive statistical analysis of the over-raising situation of thesample companies in the year of listing,on this basis Using Stata13.0 to conduct multiple regression analysis on the investment efficiency of the sample company for four consecutive years after the listing,the research results show that the greater the degree of over-raised financing,the more serious the non-investment efficiency of GEM listed companies,mainly the over-investment;Power is significantly positively related to over-investment and under-investment;when considering the relationship between over-raised financing,management power and investment efficiency,the higher the degree of over-raised financing,the more inefficient the investment of the sample companies with greater management power,mainly as Over-investment has less impact on underinvestment.At the same time,the systemicity of the investment efficiency residual measurement model was tested for robustness,and further research was conducted on the financing situation of the sample company in the year of2014-2017.Chapter 6,clarifying the conclusions of the study and proposing policy recommendations.