Research On The Effect Of Implementing Equity Incentives In State-owned Listed Companies

In 2015,the State Council issued the"Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises"to promote relevant reforms.With the deepening and normalization of state-owned enterprises,more and more state-owned enterprises are actively exploring the equity incentive model.Under the background of promoting the deepening reform of state-owned enterprises,equity incentives have received more and more attention as an important measure,and they have become more and more research-oriented and practical.At the same time,the implementation of equity incentives also represents the reform of the enterprise property rights system to a certain extent in the reform of state-owned enterprises.State-owned listed companies,as an important group in listed companies,have their national background and the dual attributes of listing supervision,making them the reform path and the achievement of the reform goals have received more attention.Based on the research of equity incentive theory(including principal-agent theory,human capital theory,and incentive theory),combined with years of work experience,this paper selects Bright Dairy as a case study,adopts qualitative and quantitative analysis,and introduces the means of combining data analysis.This led to the study of equity incentives on the performance of state-owned listed companies(ROA),research and development expenditures(RD)and agency costs(other payables PAY),and further studied the impact of corporate executive turnover on the effect of equity incentives.Proposing to improve the equity incentives for state-controlled listed companies.The research on this topic is increasingly lacking in focus and comparison.In this paper,the combination of case analysis and empirical research is used to analyze and analyze the equity incentive plan and effect analysis of state-owned listed companies.The research finds that:(1)equity incentives can be improved.State-owned enterprise performance(ROA)and corporate R&D expenditure;(2)equity incentives reduce the agency costs of state-owned enterprises;(3)the greater the supervision of senior executives,equity incentives can improve the performance of state-owned enterprises.The research results provide theoretical support and hypothesis optimization for the reform and development of China's state-owned enterprises and the construction of diversified equity incentive models,which provide a weak and reference value for the scientific and rational improvement of modern enterprise management systems.