Dividend,Fund And Agency Issues Before And After IPO

In recent years,under the impetus of the semi-mandatory dividend policy of the regulatory authorities,the dividend issue in China's A-share market has improved,and the market's willingness to pay dividends has increased significantly,but the overall dividend level of the market has not increased significantly.Compared to overseas markets,it is still at a lower dividend level here.In addition,the listed companies continue to explode scandals before the IPO,and even the company's dividend before the IPO exceeds the total amount of funds it expects to raise.listed companies pay a large dividend before listing,but reduce the intensity of dividends after listing.The capital market exists for providing financing facilities for entities lacking capital.Dividend are the return to securities investors.The company does not lack funds but has to go public,and has retained profits without giving it to investors.This is contrary to the purpose of listing financing.This article takes this as a starting point to study the reasons and motivations for the different dividends of listed companies before and after the IPO.From the perspective of agency problem,this paper studies the dividend caused by agency behavior.Companies using IPOs in 2011,2012,and 2014 were used as observational samples to obtain prospectuses for their IPOs and annual and semi-annual reports for the IPOs.The three types of agent entities in the agency problem,namely,the major shareholders,managers and shareholding institutions,are the main variables.The IPO period raised funds and other related variables are used as a bridge to construct a cash dividend model from the time of listing to the post-marketing.The model is divided into qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis from the perspective of analysis methods.It is divided into two periods before IPO and after IPO in time to analyze the impact of agency problem on cash dividends.According to the research statistics,before the IPO,the higher the management's salary,the stronger the strength and willingness of cash dividends;but the concentration of the major shareholders has no effect on the cash dividend policy.After the IPO,the incentive level of executive compensation still has the effect ofpromoting the willingness and intensity of cash dividend distribution,which is consistent with the IPO;the concentration of equity has an impact on dividend willingness and dividend intensity,and is related to the “U” type of dividend willingness;Institutional holdings reduce the level of cash dividends.In addition,the paper also finds that the proposed cash dividends of listed companies will increase the raising of raised funds,and reduce the possibility of triggering excessive funds raising;the cash dividend behavior and the dividend transfer behavior are complementary.In summary,the problem of dividend before the IPO lies in the incentive of the management,and the issue of the dividend after the IPO is affected by the major shareholder,the shareholding institution and the management.The agent who influences the cash dividend is before and after the IPO.Not exactly the same.This paper suggests that the regulatory agencies should further strengthen the reform of the incentive system for listed company managers,and at the same time guide the optimization of the shareholding structure and strengthen the supervision of the pre-IPO dividends.