The Study Of The Influence Of Senior Stock Option Incentive On Business Performance In High-tech Enterprises

For modem enterprises,the separation of powers has become one of the most obvious characteristics of all enterprises.Therefore,the problem of principal-agents caused by the separation of powers has also continuously affected the growth of enterprises.With the development of enterprises,this new type of enterprise management model has also raised the problem of the long-term development of the enterprise due to the different interests between the owner and the manager.Therefore,in the process of corporate governance,equity incentives are often used as one of the ways to solve problems.While rationally improving the shareholding structure,reducing agency costs,retaining talents,restricting senior managers to achieve interest convergence and improving corporate performance.However,there are also problems that impair the development of the enterprise due to the unreasonable implementation of the equity incentive system.For high-tech enterprises,their high growth and excellent innovation make them more need to implement talent incentives.Therefore,it is of practical significance to study the impact of equity incentives on firm performance.At present,the implementation of the equity incentive system in China is relatively common.In general,it has three major characteristics:the number of implemented enterprises is increasing year by year,the industry distribution is dominated by manufacturing and information technology services,and non-state-owned enterprises are more common.On the basis of reading a large number of references,this paper considers that most of the innovative enterprises are concentrated in the GEM and the small and medium-sized board,and after researching the relevant guidelines of the"Kechuang Board",the high-tech enterprises listed on the small and medium-sized boards are selected as the research.The object is to select the data of relevant enterprises from 2013 to 2017 before the equity incentive system in China is relatively sound and no goodwill impairment occurs.The paired sample T test and regression analysis are used to empirically test the specific relationship.Through the paired sample T test,it is found that in the high-tech enterprises listed in China’s small and medium-sized boards,there is a positive correlation between executive equity incentives and corporate performance,and for different equity-type enterprises,the sensitivity to executive equity incentive effects is different.In non-state-owned holding companies,executive equity incentives are positively correlated with corporate performance,and the ratio of executive equity incentives is less than 11.25%and greater than 48.25%.The higher the equity incentives,the better the company’s performance.When the equity incentive ratio of executives is between 11.25%and 48.25%,it is not conducive to enterprise performance creation and stock option selection.The incentive model is more conducive to the improvement of high-tech enterprise performance.Based on the above research results,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions in the final chapter from the optimization of the external environment of executive equity incentives and the improvement of the internal environment of executive equity incentives.It is also better for companies listed on small and medium-sized boards.Formulate executive incentive programs to effectively improve corporate performance,avoid adverse impacts,and achieve good development.