Accrual Earnings Management,Top Management Team Characteristics And Investment Efficiency

In recent years,with the continuous development and improvement of the capital market,the related research on enterprise accrued earnings management has also been enriched and developed.Most of the previous literature only studies the impact of accrued earnings management on external stakeholders of enterprises,but now it gradually changes to study its impact on the internal of enterprises.Because the impact of accrued earnings management on investment efficiency is very significant.Therefore,the relationship between accrued earnings management and investment efficiency has research value.Accrued earnings management refers to the use of accounting methods by financial personnel to prepare false financial reports,thus resulting in inefficient investment,which is specifically manifested in over-investment or under-investment.Senior managers of enterprises show different styles of doing things because of their different personal characteristics,so the characteristics of senior management team will also affect the correlation between accrued earnings management and investment efficiency.At present,most literatures at home and abroad only study the impact of accrued earnings management on investment efficiency,ignoring the impact of other factors on the relationship between the former two.Among them,the characteristics of top management team are worth studying variables.Based on this,according to principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and high-level ladder theory,this paper takes inefficient investment as a starting point to explore the ways to improve investment efficiency,and deeply studies the relationship between accrued earnings management and inefficient investment;At the same time,based on the analysis and summary of the existing literature,this paper makes a comparative study of the correlation between accrued earnings management and inefficient investment when enterprises have different top management teams;In order to enrich the research content,this paper takes the nature of equity into the scope of research,and studies how the nature of equity adjusts the relationship between accrued earnings management and inefficient investment.In order to optimize the executive structure of Listed Companies in China,reduce the degree of accrued earnings management,improve investment efficiency,andstrengthen internal management to provide targeted recommendations.The sample of this paper is the data of financial and insurance industry excluded from the main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017.In the empirical study,this paper firstly measures accrued earnings management with the revised Jones model used by most scholars,and then uses Richardson(2006)model to measure inefficient investment.Finally,with the research variables of ownership nature and characteristics of senior management team,grouping regression for different samples.The empirical results show that:(1)Accrued earnings management will lead to inefficient investment;(2)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the positive correlation between accrued earnings management and inefficient investment in non-state-owned enterprises is stronger,the negative impact of accrued earnings management in non-state-owned enterprises is greater;(3)the higher the average education level of senior managers,the positive correlation between accrued earnings management and inefficient investment.The longer the average tenure of executives,the weaker the positive correlation between accrued earnings management and inefficient investment.Finally,based on the above results,some suggestions are put forward,which can provide theoretical support and empirical data for improving internal governance,controlling earnings manipulation,optimizing senior management team and avoiding inefficient investment.