Relationships Research Among Equity Incentives,Agency Costs And Inefficient Investment

The level of investment efficiency is closely related to the survival and development of enterprises in the future,and the efficient investment can not only bring profits to the enterprise,but also contribute to the sustainable development of the enterprise.As for the inefficient investment behaviors of over-investment and under-investment,the existence of either party will affect the business performance of the enterprise and hinder the long-term development of the enterprise.In the case of information asymmetry and the ubiquitous principal-agent relationship,self-interested behaviors of managers emerge one after another,which greatly damage the interests of owners.If we want to reduce this kind of agency cost,we need equity incentive system to restrain.In 2016,the Equity Incentive Management Measures for Listed Companies was promulgated,which not only standardized the equity incentive behaviors of listed companies,enabled managers and owners to participate in the sharing of residual income,but also provided guidance for easing the agency conflict between managers and owners,narrowing the interest gap,and restraining the inefficient investment behavior.According to the existing literature,most scholars only focus on the direct impact of equity incentive on non-efficiency investment,and their conclusions are still divergent.Few scholars take agency cost as the intermediary effect to study the impact of equity incentive on inefficient investment.Therefore,this paper analyzes the non-efficiency investment level of overinvestment and underinvestment from the theoretical and empirical perspectives.The examination of whether equity incentive is implemented,the influence mechanism of equity incentive intensity on non-efficiency investment and the intermediary effect of agency cost further enriches the existing research results and makes the research more targeted.At the same time,it also provides reference for listed companies in China to design reasonable incentive schemes,reduce non-efficiency investment and improve internal governance system.This paper takes a-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research object,selects the sample data from 2015 to 2017 for research,and analyzes the influence of equity incentive mechanism on agency cost and inefficient investment behavior,and focuses on testing the intermediary effect of agency cost.Under the guidance of equity incentive management measures for listed companies,uses the literature research method to summarize the domestic and foreign literature related to equity incentive,agency cost and non-efficiency investment,and defines the relevant concepts of equity incentive,agency cost and non-efficiency investment.And on the basis of information asymmetry theory,incentive theory,principal-agent theory,non-efficiency investment theory,the transmission mechanism between equity incentive and non-efficiency investment,equity incentive and agency cost,and agency cost and non-efficiency investment are discussed respectively,and then the research hypothesis is put forward: inefficient investment behavior of listed companies in China,and the implementation of equity incentive mechanism can not only inhibit excessive investment,investment insufficient inefficient investment behavior,also can significantly inhibit the agency cost of the enterprise,but the proportion of incentives,the greater the inhibition,the more obvious,at the same time,the agency cost and the efficiency of investment present positive correlation between them.After theoretical analysis,data were screened and sorted out with the help of CSMAR national tai 'an database,and 7,335 sample data were finally obtained,and the specific measurement indicators involved in the paper were defined,and the non-efficiency investment level of enterprises was measured on the basis of Richardson model,and the relationship model among the three was built.Descriptive analysis,correlation analysis and regression result analysis of related variables were conducted by empirical research method,empirical test equity incentive on the specific impact of non-efficient investment,and after adding the intermediary variable of agency cost,further test whether agency cost plays a transmission role in the influence of equity incentive on non-efficiency investment,and the robustness test results verify the reliability of the research conclusions.On account of the results of theoretical analysis and empirical research,it can be concluded that: at the present stage,the listed companies in China generally have the non-efficiency investment behavior of over-investment and under-investment;the implementation of equity incentive plan can not only effectively restrain the excessive investment of enterprises,but also greatly alleviate the agency conflicts between managers and owners and reduce agency costs,moreover,the larger the proportion of excitation and the higher the intensity are,the more obvious the inhibition effect is.Therefore,In order to give greater play to the incentive effect of equity incentive mechanism and reduce the phenomenon of inefficient investment,this paper proposes the following: enterprises need to design an equity incentive plan suitable for their own development in combination with the current actual situation,establish an effective investment efficiency evaluation system,and establish a perfect professional manager market under the existing market mechanism to alleviate the agency conflict of enterprises.Of course,the Chinese government also needs to gradually increase the attention to equity incentive,improve relevant laws and regulations,standardize the current equity incentive behavior,so that the equity incentive plan can maximize its incentive effectiveness,so as to reduce the enterprise's inefficient investment behavior.