Empirical Research On Executives' Shareholding, R&D Expenditure And Corporate Performance

Independent innovation is an important source for enterprises to acquire core competitiveness,and the independent innovation capability of enterprises is largely influenced by the investment in R&D.High R&D investment is a necessary condition for realizing strong independent innovation capability.However,R&D activities are characterized by “high investment,high risk,long cycle”.Once the R&D fails or the peers get the R&D results,it will cause serious losses to the company.According to the principal-agent theory,in the modern enterprise,the separation of enterprise ownership and management rights causes the target interests of the owners and operators to be inconsistent.Coupled with the information asymmetry,the senior executives often start from their own interests and only consider the various periods of their tenure.The performance indicators ignore the long-term development of the company and try to avoid the risks of R&D activities.In order to reduce the nonefficiency loss in the process of principal-agent,it is necessary to supervise and motivate the behavior of executives.Executives' shareholding is undoubtedly an important way to solve the problem of principal-agent problems in modern enterprises.By giving a certain percentage of stocks to senior executives,executives and shareholders can form a community of interests,encourage executives to develop long-term development of enterprises,and R&D activities can enhance corporate performance,thereby enabling executives to maximize corporate value.And work hard.This paper explores the impact of executive investment on R&D investment,R&D investment on corporate performance and executive shareholding on R&D investment and firm performance through a combination of normative research and empirical research.The innovation of this paper is to use the latest data group to study the different influences of the shareholding ratio of senior executives on the R&D investment intensity under different executive shareholding ratios,and to compare the differences between R&D investment of high-tech industry and non-high-tech industry on corporate performance.And the impact of executive holdings on the relationship between the two.On the basis of summarizing and summarizing the literature review at home and abroad,through the empirical test of the non-financial listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares in 2013-2017,this paper draws the following conclusions:(1)There is a linear relationship between the shareholding ratio of senior management and the intensity of R&D investment,and executives can significantly increase the strength of R&D.(2)R&D investment can significantly promote the improvement of corporate performance,and this promotion effect is more significant in non-high-tech industries.(3)The shareholding of executives in non-hightech industries has a significant impact on the relationship between R&D expenditures and corporate performance,and there is no significant impact in high-tech industries.