| In the traditional economic growth model,natural resources are an important factor in promoting economic development.However,since the 1980s,more and more countries have fallen into the growth trap,causing economists to ponder,thus proposing the phenomenon of "resource curse",which means regions having more prosperous resources,the slower their economic development is than regions with the scarce resources,and the excessive dependence on resources affects economic growth through multiple transmission mechanisms.In China,a similar phenomenon has occurred.Since the founding of the People's Republic of China,resource-based cities have made indelible contributions to China's large-scale industrialization.However,in recent years,the economic development exposed in the development of resource-based regions has stagnated and corruption is serious.Problems such as severe damage to the ecological environment have caused more and more people to pay attention to the Chinese-style "resource curse" issue.The Chinese-style "resource curse" problem is closely related to the local government's improper management of natural resources.Improving the efficiency of government governance in resource-based areas is the key to cracking the "resource curse." In recent years,fiscal transparency has been an important manifestation of government governance.The central government attaches great importance to it.The new budget law passed in 2014 clearly states the importance of transparency and transparency of financial information,sunshine is the best preservative,and transparency is the best supervision.Whether the local government's excessive dependence on resources weakens the local institutional environment,how to improve the efficiency of government governance to solve the impact of resource dependence on regional development is an urgent problem to be solved.At home and abroad,the research on the transmission mechanism of "resource curse" mainly comes from economic factors and institutional factors.Among them,there are more literatures focusing on the impact ofeconomic factors which is caused by resource industry from one or several aspects,butthe research on institutional factors about the conduction paths are less explored.The research on the transmission mechanism of the weakening institute on which is caused by the resource curse mainly includes placing the resource industry dependence and institutional quality under the same model framework,using the theoretical model to analyze weakening the system quality which is caused by the resource industry dependence,and using the national level data to empirically test the resource industry dependence is weakening the quality of a country's system.In China,the way to explore the transmission mechanism of "resource curse" from the weakening factor of the system is the theoretical model analysis,the theoretical analysis of the weakening of the system quality through resource industry dependence,and the use of provincial and municipal level data to test the dependence of the resource industry on weakening system quality,focusing on a certain form of institutional quality such as corruption,government intervention,fiscal transparency,etc.,then study the impact of resource industry dependence on it.Among them,there is a lack of more in-depth research on the detailed institutional form of fiscal transparency.The literature mostly focuses on simple text analysis,and there are few documents that combine theoretical analysis with empirical analysis.To this end,this paper firstly combs the domestic and foreign research on the transmission path of "resource curse"and the related literature on the relationship between resource industry dependence and fiscal transparency,which provides a basis for the feasibility study of the conduction path of institutional weakening.Based on the existing theoretical analysis,it explores the impact of resource industry dependence on fiscal transparency under China's national conditions.The lack of resource property rights,the fiscal decentralization system and the lack of regulators will distort local government behaviors with natural resources.The poor fiscal performance of resource-based regions shows that it is practical to manage resource dependence from a fiscal transparency perspective.Secondly,based on the theoretical analysis of the relationship between resource industry dependence and fiscal transparency and its impact mechanism,the corresponding empirical hypothesis or theoretical model derivation is proposed,and then the static panel model and dynamic system GMM method are used to analyze and demonstrate the hypothesis.The empirical part of this paper mainly takes the panel data of 287 prefecture-level cities in China from 2012 to 2016 as the research object.Under the condition of controlling the relevant variables,the research conclusions are consistent with the theoretical analysis,that is,the resource industry dependence and fiscal transparency are negative correlation,and in the resource-dependent mode,due to the background of the fiscal decentralization system and the "GDP tournament",the resource industry dependence will curb the disclosure of financial information through the increase of"rent-seeking" and the occurrence of local financial crisis.Through the combination of theory and evidence,it shows that the dependence of resource industry has indeed weakened the institutional environment of the local government,and the governance of resource-based cities needs to improve fiscal transparency.Finally,based on the above conclusions,this paper argues that the improvement of fiscal transparency is an important means to force the reform of resource-based regions.On the one hand,it can improve the resource-based regional officials'assessment mechanism,and incorporate fiscal transparency indicators to enable local governments to allocate resources.The use of channels will continue to be transparent,reduce the opportunity for rent-seeking,manage local resource endowments more efficiently,strengthen the assessment of government debt,especially the period of debts of officials during the term of office,and weaken the debt-raising behavior of over-investment.The supervision functions of the third parties and government departments can reduce the "rights and money transactions"and "collusion between government and business" in the use of natural resources,and at the same time strengthen the punishment for illegal resources and natural resources budgets.For the government acting as an agent,the natural resources revenue should be managed in accordance with the entrustment of the people.if it is not reasonable to assume the corresponding responsibility in accordance with the principle of responsibility,in addition to the current simple administrative sanctions,there should also be investigated the economic and criminal responsibility of the relevant personnel and units,for the government to manage the power of natural resources is too concentrated and easy to abuse,Especially the key section,the proper decomposition.If the implementation of decision-making power,executive power,and regulatory power are separated,powers and responsibilities are clearly defined,and a "mutual check and balance" is formed,which makes the industrial structure of resource-based regions develop healthier. |
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