Motivation And Governance Countermeasures Of Controlling Shareholders' "Clearance-type" Reduction

In China,the share-trading reform system has changed the way the major shareholders of listed companies profit.The profit path of the company has gradually shifted from the simple dependence of the company to the securities market,and the company's profit has gradually become a joint decision between the listed company and the securities market.The relevant laws and regulations are not perfect,and the information in the market also has asymmetric characteristics.This makes the majority of shareholders who know in advance the company's mismanagement,most will choose to sell a large number of stocks to obtain more benefits,rather than proactively find and solve the company's problems.In recent years,the “clearance-type” reduction of listed companies has emerged as a new phenomenon.There have been few studies on such issues by scholars in the past.This paper selects the typical case of Yongda Group to analyze its strategic motivation and governance mechanism.Supplement the relevant research content.Due to the unprecedented history of share reform,there is no established experience for the problem of malicious reduction.This malicious shareholding behavior of major shareholders is not only not conducive to the company's reputation,but also has many negative impacts on the company's business development.At the same time,it will also cause many small and medium-sized shareholders in China to lose confidence in the securities market.This is not good for the order development of the market.Therefore,studying the malicious shareholding behavior of major shareholders is beneficial to all market participants and to the long-term development of the market.Based on the specific cases,this paper deeply explores the listed companies' use of the "high transfer" dividend policy,the controlling shareholder's "clearance-style" reduction of strategic motivation and governance countermeasures,and analyzes its "clearance-style" reduction process and its consequences.It will help investors and regulators to pay attention to the controlling shareholder's reduction behavior,effectively avoiding falling into the trap of “Yongda Group-style clearance-type reduction”.This article is divided into five chapters:Chapter 1: Introduction.The background and significance of research,focusing on the status quo of the transfer of shares by the controlling shareholder,gave a general description of the research ideas and methods of the article.Literature review.This part describes the research on the reduction of shareholder and corporate governance by domestic and foreign scholars.Firstly,it is determined that the controlling shareholder's reduction may involve the transfer of interests,and the reasons and consequences of the controlling shareholder's reduction are studied in detail.Secondly,it introduces the relevant theories of corporate governance.Chapter 2: Overview of the controlling shareholder's “clearance” reduction theory.This paper introduces the related concepts,motivations and governance mechanisms of the controlling shareholder's “clearance-type” reduction,and the various theoretical foundations used in this paper.Chapter 3: A case study of the “clearance-type” reduction of the controlling shareholder of Yongda Group.This section introduces the company profile of Yongda Group,including company profile,business status,corporate governance and ownership structure changes.The controlling shareholder's “clearance-style” reduction event was reviewed and reduced.Chapter 4: A case study of the “clearance-type” reduction of the controlling shareholder of Yongda Group.This part analyzes the motives,techniques,economic consequences,and countermeasures of the “clearance type”.Chapter 5: Research conclusions and implications.This part mainly through the theoretical analysis of holding reduction and combined with the conclusions of the study of the founding cases of the founders of Yongda Group,and the research implications of this paper.The research in this paper finds that the “clearance-type” reduction of controlling shareholders not only shows their psychological motives for short-listed companies,but also reflects the ability and opportunity of controlling shareholders to obtain benefits from listed companies due to their internal identity.In addition,in this process,due to changes in the company's key controllers,the company's governance structure and strategic direction will be greatly adjusted with the departure of key controllers,which will adversely affect the company's long-term development.At the same time,the controlling shareholder of the important participants of the corporate governance,its clearance reduction will trigger the corresponding corporate governance issues,which will have a certain negative impact on the business performance of the company and increase the business risk.This paper expands the research on the transfer of shares and the controlling shareholder reduction.From the unique perspective of the controlling shareholder's “clearance-type” reduction,it analyzes the purpose of “high-transfer” to realize the benefit transfer,and links the “high-transfer” with the controlling shareholder's reduction.This is different from the previous literature.Transfer" or controlling shareholder reduction.At the same time,most of the current literature is to analyze the motives of controlling shareholders to reduce their holdings from the perspective of empirical research.This paper studies the strategic motivation and governance mechanism of the controlling shareholder's “clearance-type” reduction in combination with specific cases,and analyzes the market reaction and business performance changes of the company before and after the “clearance-type” reduction,which is helpful to further reveal the “clearance type” of the controlling shareholder of the company.The nature of the benefits of reduction.