Industry Supervision And Stock Price Crash Risk

Beginning in 2015,under the leadership of the CSRC,China's securities supervision mode has changed from a regulatory mode under the jurisdiction to an industry supervision model.This has provided us with excellent research opportunities.This paper believes that the industry supervision mode which the CSRC and the stock exchange promoted will affect the risk of stock price crash of listed companies.Based on the "Information hiding hypothesis" of the stock price crash risk,this paper takes the listed companies of the Shanghai Stock Exchange as a sample,and uses the empirical method from the perspectives of homogeneity,development of auditing industry audit expertise and broadening of information disclosure to prove that:with the implementation of industry supervision,the degree of stock price crash risk decreases significantly.In addition,the paper also finds that for companies in the key regulatory industries,companies that have not yet received industry audits,and companies with better internal control quality,the impact of industry supervision is more significant.On the basis of studying the above problems,this paper further proves that the introduction of the industry information disclosure guidelines will strengthen the impact of industry supervision.On the other hand,it is further found that industry supervision may reduce the company's earning management,increase the stock liquidity and then reduces the stock price crash risk.This paper studies the impact of the industry supervision on the stock crash risk of listed companies.On the one hand,it supplements the theoretical research in the field of regulatory economic consequences of industry supervision,and on the other hand enriches the theoretical research on the stock price crash risk.Finally,the research results of this paper can provide reference for policy evaluation and policy development,which has certain practical significance.