| While China’s securities market has achieved certain results,it has left many problems,especially in terms of investor protection.Cash dividends are an important way for investors to share business results.They are also an important way to reduce the cost of entrusting agents and operators to transfer company value to the market.However,the equity of listed companies in China is relatively concentrated,and there are widespread problems of "one big share" and high proportion of state-owned property rights.In terms of corporate governance,such problems as low independence and the CEO and chairman duality have led to many problems in the formulation and implementation of listed companies’ cash dividend policies.Even though the relevant departments such as the China Securities Regulatory Commission have launched a series of dividend regulation policies,China’s dividend distribution still lacks stability and continuity.These policies have failed to fundamentally solve the problems of the listed companies in the dividend policy.With the further advancement of reform and opening up,many deep-seated problems are emerging:the economic growth rate is gradually slowing down,the industrial structure is facing transformation and upgrading,and the stimulus policies introduced during the financial crisis need to be further digested.In 2013,Xi Jinping made it clear that the"three-phase superposition" is the staged feature of the current Chinese economy.During this period,enterprises face more challenges and opportunities,which undoubtedly continue to influence the formulation and implementation of cash dividend policy.Based on the relevant theories,this paper tests the impact of equity structure and corporate governance on dividend policy during the three-phase superposition period,and further explores the adjustment effect of regional differences and the CEO and chairman duality on the relationship.This paper includes five chapters.The first chapter is the introduction.It mainly introduces the current academic dividend theory research and the general situation of dividend distribution of listed companies in China during the three-phase superposition period,the significance and innovation of this topic.Combined with the topic selection,domestic and foreign literature have been collated and summarized.The second chapter is the definition of concept and the theoretical basis.It mainly defines important concepts such as the three-phase superposition,and elaborates the traditional and modern dividend policy theories.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis and research hypothesis.The paper mainly analyzes the process of 8 factors affecting the dividend policy,and proposes 8 research hypotheses accordingly.The fourth chapter is the empirical test.The sample data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies in 2009-2017 is selected.Through the setting and application of the model and the data processing of Stata statistical software,the eight research hypotheses of this paper are verified one by one.The fifth chapter is the conclusions and recommendations of the study.The conclusions of the study are as follows:(1)Among the four factors of equity structure,in the three-phase superposition period,equity concentration,equity balance,institutional investors’ shareholding,and management shareholding have significantly negatively affected the dividend policy.(2)Among the four factors of corporate governance,in the three-phase superposition period,the number of board meetings significantly positively affected the dividend policy,and the CEO and chairman duality significantly negatively affected the dividend policy.The size and independence of the board of directors have no significant impact on the dividend policy.(3)In the third period,in the eastern region,the negative impact of equity balance,institutional investor holdings,management shareholding,and the CEO and chairman duality on dividend policy is more significant.In the central and western regions,the negative impact of equity concentration on dividend policy is more significant.The positive impact of board meetings on dividend policy is more significant.(4)In the three-phase superposition period,the lack of the CEO and chairman duality leads to a more significant negative relationship between equity concentration and institutional investor shareholding and dividend payout ratio.This also led to a more significant positive relationship betxween the number of board meetings and the dividend payout ratio.The empirical results of this paper have certain enlightenment for China’s economic transformation and upgrading period,further optimizing the governance structure of listed companies and improving the investor protection mechanism. |
