Equity Pledge,Analyst Tracking And Investment Efficiency

Since 1995,China’s Guarantee Law has stipulated the equity pledge system.As a financing method,equity pledge has developed rapidly in China in recent years,and its scale has gradually expanded.After the equity pledge,the pledgee is worried about the loss caused by the value of the pledge.When the stock falls to a certain level,it will ask for additional pledge.Even if the stock continues to fall,the stock will be forced to liquidate.At this timethe controlling shareholder’s control will be facing the risk of being weakened and lost.Therefore,after controlling the equity pledge,the controlling shareholder will,through its own control,intervene in a series of factors affecting its value,such as the business decision of the listed company,to achieve its own objectives.Investment decision-making is a very important part of the daily business decision-making of the enterprise,and its investment efficiency directly affects the value of the enterprise itself.Therefore,this paper intends to use the combination of theory and evidence to study the impact of controlling shareholder pledge behavior on corporate investment efficiency,and consider the analyst to track the very important external supervision mechanism in this corporate governance in the controlling shareholder equity pledge.The role of regulation in the impact of corporate investment efficiency.Further,this article will explore how the controlling shareholder influences the investment efficiency of listed companies and explores its role.The existing economic consequences of equity pledge are the impact on corporate value and performance,and few literatures have conducted more detailed research on its intermiediate mechanisms.And whether the external supervision mechanism of the analyst can play an important role in the economic consequences of the equity pledge,there is no literature.Therefore,the innovation of this paper is to focus on the impact of equity pledge on the intermediate important factors affecting enterprise value rather than directly studying its impact on corporate value.From the perspective of intermediate mechanism,we can better understand the impact mechanism of shareholder behavior on enterprises.At the same time,this article will also delve into the behavior of shareholders to make investment decisions for the enterprise through what kind of intermediary.Further,while studying the economic consequences of equity pledge,this paper also explores the role of analysts as an external monitoring mechanism,which can help us understand the important role of capital market participants in business operations..The research of this paper expands the research scope of the economic consequences of controlling shareholders’ equity pledge from the theoretical point of view,enriches the research content of the factors affecting the investment efficiency of enterprises and the research results under the principal-agent theory.At the same time,from a practical point of view,it can provide reasonable suggestions for external:investors,financial institutions and government departments,establish a complete supervision system,further standardize and improve China’s equity pledge system,and establish an effective securities market supervision system;At the same time,it helps the company to understand more deeply how the personal behavior of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge affects the enterprise itself,and helps the enterprise and the controlling shareholder to choose the appropriate financing method to avoid the behavior of encroaching on the interests of the enterprise.