The Governance Of Short Selling Mechanism On Inefficient Investment Of Enterprises

On March 31,2010,the trial of China's margin financing and securities lending transaction was officially launched,after four expansions and several adjustments,nearly one-third of A-share listed companies have been included in the margin financing and securities lending institutions.The launch of the trial marks the official introduction of short selling mechanism in China's stock market,ending the "unilateral city" status of China's stock market and improving the function of China's capital market.Some scholars have found that short-selling mechanisms will affect the behavior of stocks.Because short selling mechanism can increase the sensitivity of stock price to information and spread private negative information of enterprises,thus reducing the asymmetry between investors and managers on corporate information;at the same time,short selling mechanism is an effective means of external supervision,playing a binding role for the self-interest of shareholders and managers.In fact,improving information transparency and increasing external supervision will affect the company's investment decisions.So this paper attempts to explore the external governance role of short selling mechanism from the non-efficiency investment of enterprises,and further studies the heterogeneity of the governance role of short selling mechanism under different internal governance levels and marketization process.Using the method of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,this paper takes the 2007-2016 data of a-Share listed companies in China as a sample,and uses the double difference(did)model to study the influence mechanism of short selling mechanism on the non-efficiency investment of enterprises,The following three conclusions are drawn:(1)compared with companies that are not short selling,the two types of inefficient investment behavior are significantly reduced after the listed companies relax the constraint of short selling,(2)the lower the internal governance level,the more obvious the inhibition of short selling mechanism on the non-efficiency investment of enterprises;(3)The higher the regional marketization process,The stronger the inhibition effect of short selling mechanism on the inefficient investment of local enterprises.The above conclusion shows that the short selling mechanism has the external governance effect to the non-efficiency investment,and the short selling mechanism can play a complementary role when the internal governance mechanism of the company is absent,and secondly,as a market trading mechanism,the effective play of its function is closely related to the degree of marketization.This paper expands the research perspective of short selling mechanism,and provides theoretical support and factual basis for the implementation of margin short selling system.