A Study On Moral Hazard Of Reverse Mortgage Insurance Of Chinese Housing Based On Tripartite Game

With the aggravation of the aging population of our country and the advent of silver hair,the old-age support has become a major social problem to be solved urgently in our country,and the social endowment insurance coverage is obviously not sufficient to meet the needs of our country's seniors,and the improvement and supplement of commercial insurance is urgently needed.The housing reverse mortgage endowment insurance is a new insurance product in China,the promotion of this product will provide a new way of thinking about the financing of social endowment insurance in our country.However,due to the complexity of the housing reverse mortgage old-age insurance products and the uncertainty of participants' behavior,this product has been difficult since the launch.The use of this article "completely rational people"Assuming that the model is an auxiliary model based on the housing reverse mortgage-insurance pricing model,the sensitivity of the loan amount paid by the insurer to the insurance company and the value of the initial house assets of an insurance company are analyzed separately,respectively,and the sensitivity of the loan amount obtained by the mortgagor The necessity to prevent moral hazard of insurance company and mortgagor.In addition,the moral hazard analysis of housing reverse mortgage old-age insurance products is concentrated in the two-party game between the insurance company and the mortgagor.On this basis,the government party is introduced to construct an insurance company,the mortgagor,the government tripartite game model,and the insurance company,The moral hazard of the mortgagor analyzes the moral hazard of the mortgagor,and probes into the strategy choice behavior of the participants in the three-party game,analyzes the influence of moral hazard to the implementation of the old-age insurance business of the housing reverse mortgage insurance,and the necessity of effective government supervision.In order to promote the late development of the housing reverse mortgage old-age insurance products,the game order should be improved with a view to achieving the optimal overall effectiveness.Finally,it puts forward the government's responsibility,set up the standard punishment and subsidy mechanism,and makes clear the countermeasures of the system of housing property right.In order to prevent the risk prevention and control of moral hazard,put forward some countermeasures to change the order of product offer.