| Institutional investors are important participants in the capital market.As independent investment entities other than controlling shareholders and external small and medium shareholders,they have more capital advantages,information advantages and professional advantages than individual investors.With these advantages and long-term,rational investment philosophy,institutional investors have played the role of ex ante pricing and post-supervision in the process of corporate governance,while effectively improving the company's performance.As the most active part of institutional investors,pressure-resisting institutional investors have received widespread attention in recent years.With their independent and self-employed identities,there is no business dealings with the invested companies,and economic interests are not subject to management decisions.The various advantages of the influence make the pressure-resisting institutional investors put the overall operating interests of the invested company in the first place in the process of participating in the strategic decision-making of the invested company.In addition,these investors will adhere to their investment philosophy,actively participate in corporate governance based on their own professional advantages,clever use of incentive and restraint mechanisms,and play the role of supervisory control.Therefore,to study how pressure-resistance institutional investors can participate in corporate governance,motivate company managers,supervise “insider control”,and improve company performance,fully play the role of pressure-resisting institutional investors,realize theirrelationship with securities market and macro The linkage effect of microeconomics has important practical significance.This paper's research on pressure-resisting institutional investors mainly includes four aspects.First,the literature is summarized.The connotation and characteristics of pressure-resisting institutional investors' participation in corporate governance have been compiled,including the definition of institutional investors,the pressure-resisting institutional investors and their types,and the theoretical traceability of corporate governance,such as principal-agent theory and stakeholders.Theory,incomplete contract theory,etc.At the same time,it summarizes the current domestic and international methods,methods and research results of pressure-resisting institutional investors and their participation in corporate governance behaviors,and finds breakthroughs in research based on this,and proposes problems worth exploring;The mechanism analysis of the participation of pressure-resisting institutional investors in corporate governance.Select securities investment funds,qualified foreign investors(QFII),and social insurance funds to analyze the three types of pressure-resisting institutional investors,including their current development status in China's securities market,the reasons and motivations for participating in corporate governance,and specific implementation.Paths,constraints,etc.and based on this put forward five hypotheses;again,empirical analysis.Based on the qualitative research of the previous two parts,we conducted a specific quantitative analysis,using Csmar and Wind database to select the data of A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2016 as samples,and analyze and filter.Data data and set research evaluation indicators,determine external dependent variables,internal dependent variables and intermediate variables,descriptive statistical analysis of the data,comparative analysis of each variable and preliminary statistical analysis of variable correlation,to establish structural equations The model estimates the parameters of the influence path between the variables,tests whether the above assumptions are true,and draws conclusions.details as follows:(1)Pressure-resisting institutional investors have improved corporate performanceby avoiding the short-selling behavior of major shareholders,improving the executive compensation incentive system,and improving the company's information disclosure level.(2)Compared with social security funds and QFII,the effect of securities investment funds participating in corporate governance is most significant.(3)The effect of social insurance funds to enhance the level of executive incentives is significant.The effect of avoiding the short-selling behavior of major shareholders and improving the level of corporate information disclosure is not significant.(4)QFII has improved corporate performance by avoiding the short-selling behavior of major shareholders,improving the executive compensation incentive system,and improving the company's information disclosure level.(5)The effect of QFII participating in corporate governance is more significant than that of social insurance funds.Finally,make recommendations.Based on the above analysis results,this paper proposes the following three suggestions: First,continuously expand the shareholding ratio of securities investment funds in the company.Through analysis,it can be found that securities investment funds play a big role in both corporate management and performance improvement.The decision made by the securities investment fund on the company's senior executives can be judged and participated in an objective manner.The decisions made are more conducive to corporate governance and the improvement of company performance.At present,the average shareholding ratio of China's securities investment funds in listed companies.Still less than 8%,it is necessary to continue to increase the shareholding ratio of securities funds.Second,accelerate the introduction of QFII.The research results show that the higher the shareholding ratio of QFII,the more significant the effect of participating in corporate governance.QFII as a foreign company,on the one hand,it has a relationship with the invested enterprise,and on the other hand,there is market competition with domestic enterprises,virtually invisible.It will pressure listed companies to improve their corporate governance.At present,QFIIhas a higher threshold for entering the Chinese market and strong policy constraints,which is not conducive to giving full play to its advantages to participate in corporate governance.Therefore,it is necessary to appropriately increase the restrictions on the proportion of QFII shares,and relax QFII's fund remittance and remittance policies give full play to the advantages of corporate governance;finally,increase the participation of social security funds.As an institutional investor independent of the listed company's operating system,the social security fund can reasonably play its supervisory role in the process of corporate governance.The analysis found that its effect is not significant.The author believes that the main reason Therefore,the social security fund itself has the support of relevant national policies and the need to ensure the security of funds.This soft budget constraint and the inefficiency of insider control have caused the social security fund to play its due role in corporate governance.Therefore,improve the management of social security funds.It is necessary to participate in corporate governance and improve incentives,such as establishing effective compensation incentives. |
PDF Full Text Request