A Study OnThe Effect Of Equity Incentive On Cost Stickiness Of Listed Companies With Different Property Rights

In today's society,enterprises in the pursuit of maximizing its value is essential to research the problem of cost management,it can be said that this also is the key issue in enterprise to seek steady development in the economy under the "new normal".Because in the actual operating process,the separation of ownership and management led to the opportunism problem,but the cost and volume of business enterprises in the actual operation is not always the same proportion changes,which broke the cost behavior theory has been highly respected,in-depth empirical research on Cost Stickiness and the existence of the problem and the influencing factors of problem is imminent.From 2013,deepening the reform of the "decision",to the 2014 launch of the ESOP,and the State Administration of Taxation issued last year,the equity incentive and technology investment related tax preferential measures for the future through the equity incentive mechanism to stimulate the senior management personnel to reduce management self-interest behavior caused by cost stickiness,and thus the state-owned enterprise reform initiatives this is management of Enterprise Cost Stickiness have certain constraints.This is the above theoretical and practical background based on the environment,starting from the companies of different property rights angle,research in the opportunity of the reform of state-owned enterprises,equity incentive mechanism will have any impact on the enterprise cost of different kinds of viscosity.First of all,the literature review of the relationship between equity incentive and Cost Stickiness and the reform of state-owned enterprises is carried out,and three hypotheses are introduced.Secondly,using Anderson log model modified for the collection of Shanghai and Shenzhen two A shares of listed manufacturing companies in 2011-2015 years of sample data for empirical analysis,the existence of Cost Stickiness phenomenon inspection of listed companies,and the right incentive mechanism of listed company cost stickiness.The results show that the problem of Cost Stickiness exists generally in China's listed companies,and generally speaking,the stickiness of the cost of state-owned listed companies is more obvious than that of private listed companies.The main reason for this difference is that the state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises are mainly engaged in different industry characteristics and different controllers.Managerial ownership and cost stickiness are nonlinear correlation.Because the square term coefficient is negative,it is a kind of inverted U type.That is can reduce the Cost Stickiness of long-term equity incentive mechanism,but the current equity incentive when strength is insufficient,most managers benefit from fixed salary is difficult to the overall interests of the enterprise with their own interests together,making more "self" components.The effect of managerial ownership on Cost Stickiness will be the nature of property rights of state-owned enterprises,influence of managerial ownership on Cost Stickiness is not significant,and the management of private listed companies ownership has a significant impact on cost stickiness,inverted U type relation.This has a direct relationship with the higher level of management shareholding in private listed companies,more flexible management,and better regulation of enterprise costs.