Research About The Risk Prevention And Control Of P2P Network Lending Based On Game Theory

As a typical representative of the emerging industry form of Internet finance,P2 P network lending has promoted the rapid development of Internet finance since its online operation in China in 2006,with its high degree of innovation and strong market flexibility,and has played a positive role in the lending of small and medium-sized enterprises and individuals.However,due to inadequate supervision,non-standard management,and blind investment by investors,the frequent occurrence of risks has destroyed the order of the financial market.With the introduction of Internet financial supervision policy,a series of management measures such as withdrawal,compliance and filing make the nature of P2 P network lending gradually return to information intermediary,but risk is still inevitable,and risk prevention and control measures still need to be improved.How to make the risk prevention and control of P2 P network lending more effective is a problem that needs to be studied in this paper.In order to solve this problem,this paper firstly expounds the related theories of Internet finance,including the concept,attribute and supervision of Internet finance;the related theories of P2 P network lending risk,including information asymmetry,adverse selection,herding behavior;and game theory,including game theory and financial supervision game,which lays a foundation for the research and analysis of the problem from the theoretical point of view.Secondly,the paper analyzes the case of the collapse of the Oriental Venture Capital,and builds a risk hierarchy model from the three levels of the regulatory department,the P2 P network lending platform and the lending entity.The main risk performance of the three parties participating in P2 P network lending is identified by qualitative analysis method,and the risk causes are analyzed.Thirdly,using the game analysis method,starting from the game relationship between the platform and the regulatory authorities,the game relationship between the platform and the platform,and the game relationship between the platform and the lending subject(investors,borrowers),the game matrix is established,and the static game behavior analysis is carried out to determine the best choice and the best game strategy of the tripartite game: strict supervision by the regulatory authorities,platform acceptance of supervision.Management is the best strategy for the game between platforms and regulatory authorities;cooperation between platforms to achieve data sharing and resource exchange is the best strategy for the game between platforms;non-rigid payment of platforms and investment by investors is the best strategy for the game between platforms and investors;platform selection of high-quality borrowers and low interest rate is the best strategy for the game between platforms and borrowers.Finally,combined with the previous research and analysis and the author's work practice,from the perspective of regulatory authorities,platform management and consumer protection,according to the tendency of risk prevention,risk control and risk avoidance measures,this paper puts forward some suggestions on risk prevention and control of P2 P network lending.(1)regulatory level: implementing compulsory constraints from the legislative level,realizing credit information sharing as soon as possible,strictly enforcing information disclosure system,enhancing the effectiveness of bank deposit and management,establishing platform exit tracking system,and strengthening industry self-discipline.(2)Platform level: improving mechanism,strengthening internal control management,actively filing for compliance development,transformation and upgrading to create competitive advantages.(3)Consumer protection level: rational investment,correct screening,protection of rights and interests.In order to provide feasible ideas for the prevention and control of P2 P network lending risk in China through the above measures.