Study On The Impact Of Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge On Stock Price Crash Risk

Controlling shareholder equity pledge has been very common in China's capital market.According to Wind statistics,2360 of the 3467 A-share listed companies were pledged by the end of 2017.Among them,1894 listed companies pledged by controlling shareholders accounted for nearly 80% of the total number of equity pledge companies and more than 50% of the total number of A-share listed companies.It can be seen that as one of the main ways to ease financing constraints,equity pledge is widely favored by controlling shareholders of listed companies.However,the motivation of controlling shareholders to seek the private interests of control rights is also enhanced after the pledge of shares.Once the stock price falls and touches the liquidation warning line,it will lead to a large number of company shares being sold and increase the risk of stock price collapse of listed companies.After the pledge of controlling shareholder's equity,other major shareholders besides controlling shareholders(hereinafter referred to as other major shareholders)can supervise and restrain the private interest behavior of controlling shareholders and reduce the risk of stock price collapse.They may also choose to conspire with controlling shareholders for their own interests and aggravate the behavior of interest embezzlement,thereby increasing the risk of stock price collapse.Therefore,this paper studies the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of future stock price collapse,and explores the regulatory role of other major shareholders on the above-mentioned impact based on the two possibilities of other major shareholders' supervision and collusion against controlling shareholders.Based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,private interest theory of control rights and separation theory of control rights and cash flow rights,this paper analyses the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of future stock price crash,and supervises or controls the controlling shareholders according to other major shareholders.Choose two possibilities of collusion with other major shareholders,and make a theoretical analysis of the regulatory role of other major shareholders in the above-mentioned impact;furthermore,use multiple linear regression model to test the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of future stock price crash,and using difference analysis and variance analysis to test the regulatory role of other major shareholders.This paper draws the following conclusions through research: compared with listed companies without pledge of controlling shareholders' equity,listed companies with pledge of controlling shareholders' equity have greater risk of future stock price collapse,and the risk of future stock price collapse increases with the increase of the proportion of the controlling shareholder's equity pledge,which indicates that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge has a positive impact on the risk of future stock price collapse;at the same time,this paper explores the regulatory role of other major shareholders due to their supervision or collusion with controlling shareholders.,and the results show that the controlling shareholder's equity pledge has a positive Under the influence of other major shareholders,the positive impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of future stock price collapse is weakened,which indicates that other major shareholders have a supervisory and restraining effect on the behavior of controlling shareholders' equity pledge,thus further weakening the positive impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of future stock price collapse,rather than choosing to conspire with them.The innovation points of this paper are as follows: on the one hand,this paper further studies the impact of the proportion of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of future stock price collapse,deepens the research on the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge on the risk of stock price collapse;on the other hand,this paper studies from the perspective of other major shareholders' supervision and collusion with controlling shareholders,the perspective is novel.Finally,according to the research conclusion,this paper puts forward three countermeasures and suggestions: strengthening the supervision of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior,perfecting the equity pledge system and perfecting the company's equity structure,in order to play a certain role in the supervision of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior and further prevent the risk of stock price collapse.