Research On Enterprise's Cost Stickiness Based On Manager's Self-interested Behavior And Its Prevention Mechanism

The cost is the core content of enterprise's cost management,which is directly related to the profitability of the enterprise.Doing a good job of cost control is a powerful guarantee for improving the management efficiency and market competitiveness of enterprises.The traditional theory of cost behavior in management accounting considers that the cost of enterprise is a linear function of business volume.As early as the 1990s,relevant scholars questioned the traditional cost-state model and confirmed the cost of enterprise is not a linear function of business volume through empirical data.The drawback of the traditional theory of cost behavior is that it regards the business volume as the only driving factor for the change of cost,and does not consider the impact of the internal and external environment of the enterprise on the cost stickiness.The concept of "cost stickiness" has led people to re-examine the cost behavior of enterprises.Under the modern enterprise system,Self-interested behavior of managers in principal-agent relationship is the main reason for increasing the cost stickiness of the enterprise.What kind of mechanism is adopted to prevent and constrain the manager's Cost stickiness behavior is worth pondering.From the perspective of manager's self-interested behavior,this paper firstly finds the entry point of this paper by reviewing the research on cost stickiness,and then expounds the relevant theories to provide the basis for the research.On this basis,it analyzes the adverse selection and moral hazard of cost stickiness control under the manager's self-interested behavior.In order to solve the problem of adverse selection,this paper constructs signal discrimination model.In order to alleviate the moral hazard,this paper constructs the compensation model,the supervisory model,and the reputation model respectively based on the principal-agent income function of the cost stickiness controller's effort level.Finally,different control mechanisms of cost stickiness are constructed based on the conclusions of solutions and analyses of the models.The conclusions are as follows:(1)The signal discrimination mechanism can alleviate the risk of adverse selection in the cost stickiness control;(2)Incentives based on the cost stickiness controller's output ratio can encourage cost stickiness controller to work hard.When establishing the incentive mechanism of compensation,the enterprise can reduce the cost stickiness controller's cost coefficient,the degree of absolute risk aversion,and the retained utility;(3)The enterprise implements supervision mechanism can constrain the self-interest behavior of the cost stickiness controller,and it can reduce the incentive coefficient of the cost sticky controller's output and strengthen the effort level of the cost stickiness controller;(4)Compared with the pure incentive mechanism of compensation,the reputation effect can strengthen the effort level of cost stickiness controller and achieve better incentive effect,and effectively alleviate the problem of cost stickiness caused by manager's self-interested behaviorThe contribution of this paper is to construct a mathematical model for preventing the self-interested behavior of managers from causing the problem of enterprise's cost stickiness by using principal-agent theory,game theory and information economics theory.Through the solutions and analyses of the models,this paper provides a theoretical basis for how to formulate control mechanism of cost stickiness,and explores a research direction of cost stickiness control.In a word,this paper provides a theoretical and practical guidance for enterprise's cost management.