Research On The Influence Of Corporate Governance Structure On Real Earnings Management

The problem of earnings management has always been a hot topic in the field of accounting research.At present,domestic and foreign scholars' research on the impact of corporate governance structure on earnings management is mainly focused on accrued earnings management.In recent years,with the continuous improvement of market supervision environment,the space for accrued project earnings management is continually compressed,and management has turned its attention to more concealed and lower-cost real earnings management.An important goal of the current economic development is to improve the ability to innovate.R&D expenses are an important factor in the company's ability to improve its innovation.If management manages real earnings management by cutting R&D expenditures for a long time,it will seriously damage the company's ability to innovate.Conducive to the realization of the company's long-term value,affecting the long-term development of the company.In view of this,one of the manipulation methods of real earnings management(manipulable R&D expenses in discretionary cost manipulation)is the research perspective,empirically testing the impact of corporate governance structure on management's real earnings management behavior,in order to identify and respond more effectively.Management conducts real earnings management through steerable R&D expenses while helping to improve corporate governance.Firstly,this paper introduces the current research background.From theperspective of corporate governance structure and real earnings management,it sorts out the domestic and foreign literature related to this research.Through reviewing the literature,we can understand the current research status at home and abroad.Lay the foundation for the subsequent analysis of the paper.Secondly,it analyzes and expounds the governance structure and the concepts related to real earnings management,and draws on the research results of scholars to summarize the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and contract theory involved.The theoretical basis.Then,based on the previous theoretical analysis,the research hypothesis of this paper is proposed from four aspects: ownership structure,board characteristics,supervisory board characteristics and management characteristics.The hypothesis is selected according to the hypothesis,the relevant variables are defined,and the research model is established.Then,4,795 sample data of 957 listed companies in China from 2013 to 2017 were selected for regression analysis to test whether the proposed hypothesis is reasonable.At the same time,the model was tested for robustness.Finally,based on the analysis results,combined with the current actual situation of listed companies in China,put forward relevant suggestions,pointing out the limitations of this paper and possible future research directions.The research in this paper will help to enrich the theoretical research related to real earnings management,help to improve the governance structure of listed companies,establish a reasonable and effective governance mechanism to reduce real earnings management behavior,and help promote the healthy and efficient operation of capital markets.Through empirical research,it is found that there is a close relationship between the internal governance structure of the company and the manipulation of R&D expenses.Equity concentration and equity checks and balances can effectively inhibit management's manipulation of R&D expenses for real earnings management;the larger the size of the board,the lower the degree of R&D expenses;the greater the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors,the stronger the constraints on management's R&D expenses;the effect of the number of board meetings on real earnings management during the year requires the cooperation of other internal governance institutions;the size of the board of supervisors and thenumber of meetings of the board of supervisors and the degree of R&D expenses are not significant;there is a significant negative correlation between executive compensation and executive shareholding ratio and R&D operations.