Research On The Influence Of The Pledge Behavior Of Controlling Shareholders On The Liquidity Level Of Listed Companies

In recent years,with the implementation of policies related to deleveraging,the financing problem of enterprises has become severe,which will curb the development of enterprises,or even will be the last straw to bankrupt firms.Equity pledge financing also develops rapidly under this background and is favored by controlling shareholders.There are also a lot of risk points behind the phenomenal growth in equity collateral.For example,after the equity pledge of the controlling shareholders,the company will be tunneled in the face of the risk of control rights transfered,which is likely to cause liquidity fluctuations and thus cause the rupture of the company's capital chain.However,there are few studies on the liquidity level of listed companies focusing on the pledge behavior of controlling shareholders.The main methods used in this paper are normative analysis and empirical analysis.In the normative analysis,this paper USES the principal-agent theory,control right theory,incomplete contract theory and pecking order financing theory to explain the separation of control right and cash flow right caused by layer upon layer delegation of control right in modern enterprises,namely the separation of two rights.And the pledge of the controlling shareholder will aggravate the separation of the two rights.The greater the degree of separation between the two rights,the greater the incentive of controlling shareholders to tunnel the company,and the greater the return on control rights will be.When controlling shareholders face the pressure of debt repayment through pledge of equity,they give priority to internal financing of the company.The most direct way of internal financing is to directly occupy funds for the company,which will inevitably have a negative impact on the cash flow of listed companies.In the empirical analysis,this paper collected relevant data of 3,439 listed companies in the five years from 2013 to 2017,and established a multiple regression model to explore whether the pledge behavior of controlling shareholders would have a negative impact on the cash flow level of listed companies.Then the paper studies whether equity balance,independent director and marketization level can alleviate this problem to some extent from the perspective of internal and external governance of the company.Finally,the explained variables were replaced to ensure the robustness of the research conclusions.Through the research,it can be found that the pledge of equity by controlling shareholders will reduce the liquidity level of listed companies,and equity balances,independent directors and marketization can play a positive role in the process,effectively weakening the negative impact of equity pledge on the liquidity level of companies.Finally,the paper argues that,first of all,for the regulators,it is necessary to strictly implement the risk control measures of the equity pledge financing business.Secondly,listed companies should timely adjust and optimize the internal governance structure.Finally,relevant government agencies should further promote the marketization process,establish and improve the relevant legal system,and create a good external environment for the healthy development of listed companies.