Study On The Customers,behavior And Firm,pricing Strategy Of Different Price Mechanisms

Under the background of continuous social progress,rapid economic development and rapid advancement of science and technology,the tertiary industry has gradually increased its proportion.Service science has attracted widespread attention at home and abroad.As a branch of operation research,queueing theory has become a research hotspot.At the same time,people’s various needs are increasing,and the competition among service organizations in the queueing system is becoming more and more fierce.Customers must have become the main body of decision-making,that is,customers also play games.That is,based on the system information that customers has mastered and the "R-C"(return-cost)structural equation,customers think about their interest,and then make a rational decision:enter or stop.Based on the queueing economics,this paper introduces two price meehanisms,and studies the M/M/1 ordinary vacation queueing system and the maintainable M/M/1 queueing system with negative customers.For the M/M/1 ordinary vacation queueing system,the service price of the vacation and the working period is set differently,and the customer and enterprise income functions are constructed respectively.As the starting point,the customers and the enterprise are all seeking the maximization of interest,then we study the customer equilibrium strategy behavior and the enterprise optimal service pricing decision.Based on the "R-C" structure,the customer’s strategic behavior was studied in a completely visible,almost invisible,and completely invisible state.Through Matlab experiments,the impact of service price on customer equilibrium strategy is studied,and the effect of service price on enterprise income under almost invisible condition is described.In the completely invisible situation we research the change of service price with potential arrival rate,and the relationship between the service price of the normal working period and the vacation period is studied when the maximum income is obtained.For the repairable M/M/1 queuing system with negative customers,the service cost is not fixed and the service fee is fixed,The customer and enterprise income functions are constructed respectively,then we obtain the enterprise service cost function.As the starting point,the enterprise pursues the maximum benefit,then we diseuss the eustomer equilibrium strategy,and obtain the optimal service cost pricing for the enterprise.Finally,through numerical simulation,the influence of parameters(μ、σ、β、λ)on the equilibrium mix strategy is analyzed in the almost invisible state.In addition,the influence of parameters(β、λ)on the optimal expected return of the enterprise under two states is also compared,these two states are almost invisible and completely invisible.