Securities Analysts Pay Attention To The Research On The Impact Of Dual Agency Costs

In modern enterprises,the separation of ownership and control becomes normal,which leads to the agency problem between shareholders and managers,it's called the first type of agency problem.With the development of principal agent theory,some scholars have found that most enterprises' equity is concentrated,especially in emerging market countries.The agency problem between the major shareholders and the minority shareholders is the main agency problem,it's called the second type of agency problem.In China,the equity of most listed companies is concentrated,so China's listed companies generally face two types of agency problems,and two types of agency problems will lead to double agency costs.Therefore,the framework of corporate governance based on double agency costs has become focus of research in China.Corporate governance is mainly aimed at alleviating agency conflicts in enterprises and reducing agency costs.Corporate governance is divided into internal governance mechanisms and external governance mechanisms.As an important part of external governance mechanisms,securities analysts can exert governance effects.Securities analysts can reduce agency costs.The specific mechanisms are as follows.First,securities analysts are important information brokers in the capital market,which weakens information asymmetry,while information asymmetry is an important cause of agency problems.Investors and other stakeholders can use the analyst's information to monitor and question managers or major shareholders,reducing their motivation for opportunistic behavior and thereby reducing agency costs.Second,analysts can play an external supervisory role.Because analysts have deep professional competence and multiple ways to obtain information,they can externally monitor the opportunistic behavior of management and the behavior of major shareholders infringing minority shareholders.Based on the framework of double agency costs,the paper uses big data of A-share Listed Companies in China from 2006 to 2016,The panel data is used to empirically analyze the impact of analysts' coverage on double agency costs,selling and administrative expenses,total asset turnover and over-investment are substitute variables of the first type of agency cost,other receivables are substitute variables of the second type of agency cost,the paper studies the impact of analysts' coverage,star analysts' coverage and independent analysts' coverage on double agent costs,besides,the paper studies the impact of audit quality and property rights on above relationship through grouped regression.The inhibitory effect of analysts' coverage on double agency costs is significant in the samples that are not audited by big four auditing firms,while not significant in the samples that are audited by big four auditing firms.analysts focus on the negative relationship between dual agency costs in non-state-owned enterprises.The inhibitory effect of analysts' coverage on double agency costs is significant in non-state enterprises,while not significant in state-owned enterprises.Therefore,according to conclusions,this paper proposes four policy recommendations.The first is to speed up the construction of security analysts and enhance the professional competence of analysts.The second is to improve the independence of security analysts in China and strengthen the professional ethics of security analysts.The third is to strengthen investor education and inform investors about non-independent.the fourth is to play the complementary role of audit supervision and analysts coverage on agency costs.