Institutional Ownership、Agency Cost And Corporate Performance

Under the growing trend of global institutional investors,China’s institutional investors have also experienced rapid development,and gradually become a pivotal force in the field of Chinese securities market and listed company governance.It is of great significance to deeply study the influence of institutional investors on the performance of listed companies and to deeply analyze the mechanisms and ways for institutional investors to participate in the governance of listed companies.This paper takes China’s Shenzhen-Shanghai A-share listed company as the research object after the completion of China’s share-trading reform,and uses regression model,intermediary model and adjustment model to conduct empirical research.This paper firstly verifies the relationship of institutional ownership and firm performance,including the impact of overall,pressure-resistance and pressure-sensitive institutional investors’ shareholdings on firm performance.Then based on the main effect test of the previous step,further explores whether the pressure-resisting institutional investors influence the enterprise performance by reducing the agency cost,that is,the path research with agency cost as the intermediary variable.Finally,the paper analyzes the influence of the property rights of enterprises on the relationship between the shareholding ratio of investors and the performance of enterprises,and the impact of the property rights of enterprises on the agency costs.The empirical results show that the overall shareholding of institutional investors is conducive to improving corporate performance,and the pressure resistance type has played a significant positive impact.Between the pressure-resisting institutional investors and corporate performance,the second type of agency costs has a significant intermediary role,while the mediating role of the first type of agency costs is not obvious.The study also found that the nature of state-owned property rights is positively regulating the main effect,and among state-owned enterprises,the pressure-reduction-type shareholdings have a stronger effect on the reduction of the second type of agency costs.Finally,this paper proposes suggestions on how to promote the development of institutional investors and further improve the level of corporate governance.At the same time,it points out the limitations of this paper and the direction of further research.