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Dynamic Game Analysis On Peer-to-Peer Of Lending

Posted on:2020-02-24Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J H YueFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330578482354Subject:Industrial Economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The first year of China's online lending business was in 2007.The PPDAI was officially established in China.China has achieved a breakthrough in P2P lending business.The online lending platform is increasingly favored by individuals and small and micro-enterprise owners because of its simple process,efficient approval,flexible lending,unsecured and unguaranteed.It is also in line with the "inclusive" finance advocated by China.However,since 2017,the P2P online lending platforms have experienced frequent problems.And more and more lenders lost confidence in the online lending platforms.In order to prevent the spread of "thunder tide",regulators have paid more and more attention to industry supervision.The paper analyzes the factors affecting each subject's strategy and the participating subjects through the study of the game behavior among the participating subjects.The equilibrium problem of the game.The paper mainly studies the game behavior between lending participants,including the borrowers,P2P lending platforms,lenders and regulators.The main body is discussed from three aspects.Firstly,the game behavior between P2P lending and the borrowers is studied.And a dynamic game model between the platforms and the borrowers under incomplete information is established.The analysis shows that the borrowers will submit the real information and the platforms will review that when the cost is relatively high.Secondly,the game behavior between the borrowers and the lenders is studied.Single-stage game behavior,two-stage game behavior and infinite repeated game behavior are analyzed by inverse induction.It is concluded that can achieve equilibrium in a sufficiently long period of time.Finally,the game behavior between P2P lending and regulators is studied.Through the established evolutionary game model,it is concluded that there are equilibrium strategies in each period.But there is no equilibrium point.The innovations of this paper are as follows.Firstly,when studying the game behavior between subjects,some influencing factors have been internalized to reduce the interference of subjective judgment.Secondly,when studying the game behaviors of borrowers and lenders,the paper is adopted the method of posterior probability.Thirdly,this paper analyzes the online lending behavior from borrowers,P2P lending,lenders and regulators.And the behavior is analyzed comprehensively.What's more,under the incomplete information,different analysis is carried out according to the game characteristics of different subjects and different dynamic game models are established.
Keywords/Search Tags:Peer-to-peer of lending, Endogenous, Posterior probability, Incomplete information
PDF Full Text Request
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