Research On The Relationship Between The Degree Of Control Of Large Shareholders In Family Business And Non-efficiency Investment

This paper selects family business as the initial sample that listed in the A-share of Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2008-2016,and investigates the controlling degree of the associated large shareholders from two aspects of the ownership structure and the decision-making management structure to analyze the relationship between the controlling degree of the associated large shareholders and the non-efficiency investment.Furthermore,the regulating effect of the independent director and the process of marketization on the relationship between the controlling degree of the large shareholders and the non-efficiency investment is discussed respectively.From the perspective of the ownership structure,the associated large shareholder's proportion of holding equity of the family business is used to measure the controlling degree of the associated large shareholders.And the results show that when the other conditions are certain,the higher the proportion of shares held,the more likely to lead to inefficient investment;From the point of the decision-making management structure,the controlling degree of the associated large shareholders are measured by the proportion of boards,supervisors and senior executives appointed by associated large shareholders of family business.It is found that under certain other conditions,the higher proportion of boards,supervisors and senior executives appointed by associated large shareholders of family enterprises,the more likely to lead to inefficient investment.Further research on independent directors shows that the scale of independent directors has a significant negative regulating effect on the relationship between the proportion of shares held by associated large shareholders and inefficient investment.And there is also a negative regulating effect on the relationship between the proportion of boards,supervisors and senior executives appointed by associated large shareholders and the inefficient investment,but the regulating effect is not very much.Further research on the process of marketization shows that the marketization process has a significant negative regulating effect on the relationship between the proportion of shares held by associated large shareholders and inefficient investment and the relationship between the proportion of boards,supervisors and senior executives appointed by associated large shareholders and the inefficient investment.That is,the independent directors and the marketization process can restrain the non-efficient investment behavior caused by the associated large shareholders and improve the investment efficiency of the enterprise.