Research On The Impact Of Equity Acquisition On Private Benefits Of Target Company Executives

In recent years,it is not uncommon for executives of listed companies to receive "sky-high salary",suffer from the coexistence of performance decline and salary increase,as well as huge on-the-job consumption.The chaos of executives’ private income continuously stimulates the public’s nerves and causes investors’ concern.In academic circles,the compensation and consumption beyond the reasonable range of senior executives,namely the improper private benefits of senior executives,are called executives’ private benefits.In essence,executives’ private benefits are the encroachment on the interests of shareholders.In the long run,this will lead to the decline of corporate value,the unfair distribution of resources,and even the deterioration of social morality.Therefore,how to govern executives’ private benefits has become the focus of public concern.This paper mainly studies the governance effect of equity acquisition on the private benefits of executives of target companies and how different factors affect the governance effect of equity acquisition on the private benefits of executives of target companies.Firstly,this paper introduces the research topic through the introduction of the research background,and summarizes and evaluates the relevant research results at home and abroad.Then,it introduces the two theoretical bases of this paper--agency theory and control market theory,and proposes six hypotheses after theoretical analysis.Hypothesis 1 explores the impact of equity acquisition on executives’ private benefits.On the basis of hypothesis1,five other hypotheses are proposed.Hypothesis 2,3 and 4 explore the influence of different kinds of equity acquisition on executives’ private benefits.Hypothesis 5 and 6 study the influence of equity acquisition on different target companies from the perspective of property rights and equity concentration.Then,this paper selects the a-share listed companies from 2008 to 2017 as the empirical samples,constructs the relationship model between equity acquisition and the executives’ private benefits of the target companies,and conducts empirical test and analysis on each hypothesis.The robustness of the regression results of the core hypothesis was tested by using PSM,changing the measurement method of independent variables,and lagging the independent variables for one period.It is found that equity acquisition can have significant governance effect on nonmonetary private benefits of executives of target companies,but has no significant effect on monetary private benefits.In the discussion of the influence of equity acquisition on executives’ private benefits under different factors,it is found that secondary market acquisition has the strongest inhibitory effect on executives’ private benefits,followed by agreement acquisition,and other methods such as free transfer are the weakest.When equity acquisition leads to the change of controlling shareholders,it has a stronger inhibitory effect on executives’ private benefits.Whether the equity acquisition is completed or not can restrain the executive’s private income.The completed equity acquisition has a stronger influence than the terminated equity acquisition.Compared with state-owned enterprises,the acquisition of equity in private enterprises has a stronger inhibitory effect on the private benefits of executives of target companies.Among the companies with low concentration of equity,equity acquisition has a stronger inhibiting effect on the private benefits of the executives of the target companies.