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Accounting Conservatism,management Power And Corporate Overinvestment

Posted on:2020-12-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R X WeiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330578951368Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since 2004,when the system of "bidding and hanging" was implemented in all aspects for commercial land use,China's real estate market has ushered in a golden period of rapid development,and the real estate industry has become the main force driving the continuous growth of China's GDP.At the same time of rapid development,it also faces the prominent problem of over-investment,which has become an obstacle to the stability and sustainable development of the real estate industry.Therefore,it is necessary to explore how to restrain the Over-investment Behavior of real estate enterprises.Some scholars have studied the impact of accounting conservatism on Over-investment from the perspective of accounting principles.A large number of research results show that accounting conservatism has a significant inhibitory effect on over-investment.Because accounting conservatism includes conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism,in order to further accurately and comprehensively grasp the impact mechanism of accounting conservatism on over-investment,it is necessary to examine the impact of accounting conservatism on over-investment Sound,and which kind of robustness is more effective for restraining overinvestment.In addition,some scholars believe that the increase of managerial power may aggravate the problem of over-investment,and there is a close relationship between managerial power and accounting conservatism.However,there is still a lack of research on the impact of the interaction between managerial power and accounting conservatism on over-investment.This paper takes real estate enterprises as the research object,divides accounting conservatism into conditional conservatism and unconditional conservatism,examines the impact of both on over-investment,and explores the regulatory role of management power on the relationship between two types of accounting conservatism and over-investment.Selecting the data of real estate listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2013 to 2017 as samples,475 valid samples were obtained through screening and regression with Richardson's expected investment model.Finally,237 over-investment samples were obtained.Then,the over-investment samples were analyzed by statistical methods such as multiple regression and robustness test.The main conclusions are as follows: both conditional and unconditional robustness of real estate enterprises can restrain over-investment,but conditional robustness can restrain over-investment better than unconditional robustness;the greater the power of real estate enterprises,the more they will aggravate their over-investment;the power of management will weaken the real estate enterprises The restraint of unconditional robustness on overinvestment.This paper reveals the difference between the two accounting conservatism of real estate enterprises on the impact of over-investment,and the regulatory role of management power on the relationship between the two accounting conservatism and over-investment.The conclusion of the study provides guidance for real estate enterprises to improve over-investment by improving accounting conservatism.At the same time,it also helps real estate enterprises to achieve a positive interaction between accounting conservatism and accounting conservatism through rational allocation of management power,and achieve the effect of restraining over-investment.
Keywords/Search Tags:Real estate enterprises, Over-investment, Accounting conservatism, Management power
PDF Full Text Request
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