Research On The Influence Of Institutional Investors On Investment Efficiency

Investment behavior plays an important role in the development of enterprises.The investment efficiency of enterprises determines the growth and development of enterprises and the realization of corporate value.In China's capital market,the low investment efficiency of listed companies is a common problem,which not only hinders the development of enterprises,but also goes against the allocation of resources in the whole market,resulting in the waste of resources and unfavorable to the economic development.At present,China's institutional investors have developed rapidly under the incentive of national policies,and their types tend to be diversified,becoming important investors that cannot be ignored in the capital market.Generally,compared with ordinary investors,institutional investors have more resource advantages,and can play an active supervision role on enterprises and improve the governance mechanism by relying on their capital advantages,professional management experience and broad information channels.In this context,this paper studies whether institutional investor shareholding can play a positive role in promoting the improvement of investment efficiency of enterprises in China,and explores whether agency cost plays an intermediary role.On the one hand,this paper discusses the strategies to improve the investment efficiency;on the other hand,it enriches the research on the governance role of institutional investors and its influencing mechanism.Firstly,this paper sorts out relevant researches on institutional investors,agency costs and investment efficiency,and analyzes the relationships among the three.Secondly,on the basis of theoretical analysis,this paper proposes the basic assumptions and constructs models to empirically test the role of heterogeneous institutional investors' shareholding in non-efficiency investment,two types of agency costs,and the mediator effect of agency costs.Furtherly,we study the difference of institutional investors' influence between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.Also,lag variables are used in the model to alleviate the endogeneity problem.Furtherly,we introduced instrumental variables to control possible endogeneity problem at robustness test.Finally,the article come to these conclusions:overall institutional investors reduces the efficiency of investment,and agency costs have partial mediator effect on them;After classifying institutional investors,the study finds that only pressure-resistant institutional investors have a significant effect on reducing non-efficiency investment,and agency costs have partial mediator effect.In addition,institutional investors can play a better governance role in non-state-owned enterprises,reduce the two types of agency costs and improve investment efficiency.The research of this paper provides a beneficial perspective for formulating the development strategy of institutional investors scientifically,reducing agency costs and improving the investment efficiency of enterprises.